Does anyone remember a number of years ago, perhaps even a few months before the crash that the RAF statisticians came to kinloss to give a presentation? I remember that they said at the time that "we (the RAF) were statistically due a large aircraft loss". At the time that gave me much food for thought, in fact it troubled me greatly. I had no idea what was to come. Was that dramatic wake up call acknowledged but then ignored?
All I can presume is that it was as I have not seen it in H C report. I just wondered what if any impact that department had on flight safety.
All services are allowed, in fact required, by PUS to assume a given attrition rate for every aircraft. The rate is used to inform forward provisioning i.e. make EP bids to replace in advance. It is a peacetime device. These stats don’t say HOW an aircraft will be lost – part of the formula is life-ex.
This process has not been used for many years, despite being the subject of many a critical audit report. That is, the policy has moved from maintaining capability to adjusting capability or tasking to compensate for attrition. Now we are at war, the problem is exacerbated as tasking has increased despite attrition.
You ask what impact that department has on flight safety. I'm a civvy and that job was something you used to do before being allowed to manage a project. My terms of reference included a statement that I could overrule EP instructions using engineering judgment. It is a unique authority in MoD. Again, it is no longer implemented.
What is far more relevant is that in 2005 (before XV230 was lost) Adam Ingram was warned, in writing, that the airworthiness regulations were not being implemented properly, and had not been for some years. He denied it, in writing. The people who advised him to say this should be named and shamed before those in the H-C report.
Good post on Mick Smith’s blog.