Originally Posted by alemaobaiano
CONF iture, as they acknowledge Bacolod and Taipei in the very next paragraph I don't see that they are saying anything outrageous. They point out that TAM didn't have H2F3 and that the revised procedure wasn't followed, neither of which can be laid at the door of Airbus or the BEA.
Don’t you think it’s outrageous to pretend that Congonhas was
not foreseeable when you know what happened in Bacolod and Taipei ?
They acknowledge Bacolod and Taipei but outrageously pretend that Congonhas was clearly different.
How was it different ?
All of these accidents are a direct consequence of
pilots forgetting to place in the IDLE detent the thrust lever corresponding to the engine whose thrust reverser was inoperative
As early as 98 after Bacolod, the Philippines investigation team clearly identified that the RETARD callout could cease without having both thrust levers in idle detent (page 8 of the Philippino report)
Six years later, after Taipei, the Taiwanese investigation team made the clear recommendation to Airbus Company (page 102 of the Taiwanese report)
Reviewing the design of stop mode of Retard warning sounds or accommodating other warning methods to ensure that the warning will
continue before the thrust levers are pulled back to Idle notch after a touchdown has affirmed
The H2F3 response is totally inappropriate.
Who need another ECAM message when the obvious logical answer is simply to not cease the RETARD callout as long as both thrust levers are not on the IDLE stop.
Now – The similar recommendation is signified ONE MORE TIME to Airbus France SAS
RSV (A) 170/A/07
The optimization of the A-320 RETARD advisory (warning?) system, so that it will only execute the function for which it was designed, that is, to advise the crew to retard the thrust levers to the IDLE detent.
What is the BEA comment on recommendation 170/A/07 ?
NOTHING – ZERO – They just ignore it – Far more easier to flee than to have to face the fact.
All I can read is on page 119
Since the accident, the manufacturer has been studying new corrective actions to take into account this scenario, which is now known
Aside from the fact that the scenario was already known before, we would like to know what will be these corrective actions ?
What about a modification of the RETARD callout … finally ?
I am not in a position to dispute your concerns on TAM but all I can say is :
- TAM was not involved in Bacolod
- TAM was not involved in Taipei
- I don’t think 4HolerPoler was working for TAM at the time (?)
To resume :
- Total lack of discernment on the part of Airbus.
- Obvious submission of the BEA.
What to expect now from AF447 'investigation' … !?