Caspian,
I doubt it. If you were going to bin the CVF programme - and the command staffs, MWCers and all the design and programme management people - then I suspect you'd do this on the basis of the boosting the RN's useful capabilities that can provide a punch above our weight blah blah when we're operating in a coalition.
In this scenario, the USN provides the fast air from CVN/CVNX and RN provides amphibiosity in support of 3 Cdo Bde - OCEAN, ALBION, BULWARK and the Bays at a push is a substantial capability. In losing CVF, what you would lose is the ability to deploy this into a scenario where the opposition had a credible air force and/or needed UK fast air to gain theatre entry without HNS, and in which we're operating on ourown (minus USN).
There's no doubt that this would crimp the UK's style - but the question is what are the scenarios in which we would ever need to do it all ourselves?
The only scenario where I think you can sensibly make the case is the Falklands - in which case we've got to lose them first. So don't lose them!
IMHO, this is the problem that the RN really faces - CVF is a undoubtedly a very shiny toy, but it's not actually all that operationally CRITICAL in that many scenarios. Useful? Yes. Bigger and better than what the French have - absolutely. But CRITICAL? No, not that often - if at all (Falklands).
Fundamentally, let's not confuse two important concepts:
Useful* - makes a substantial contribution, but not critical to an operation
Critical - operation cannot happen without it.
So I'd prefer for the RN to have a series of critical enabling capabilities (ASW, ASuW, AAW, Amphibs) that allow us to bolt onto a coalition operation than to mortgage everything to have two x CVF and bugger all else other than what's needed to protect it.
S41
*E.g. Sending Ark Royal across the Atlantic for the Belmopan flyby was useful, but not critical. Full credit to the RN blokes for pulling it off, but it wasn't essential.