ULMFlyer and alemaobaiano, Obrigado for your help.
All I can see is the obvious failure of a system : The BEA should be a leader in the continuous research of SAFETY but instead they show their total inbreeding with Airbus.
Page 118 "Furthermore, the BEA thinks that the Congonhas event was not foreseeable"
Page 119 "Since the accident, Airbus has been studying new corrective actions to take in account this scenario, which is now known"
How do they dare writing that after Bacolod and Taipei ???
Already after the first accident there was a very simple modification to be applied on the RETARD callout logic to help to prevent a recurrence !
Now, as a recommendation in that direction is done once again (170/A/07 on page 115 ) Airbus simply choose to ignore it in its comments.
It is disconcerting.
Help again : In the present report, any further specific detail on what does include the FWC (H2F3) standard except the triggering of a specific warning associated to an ECAM message ENG X THR LEVER ABV IDLE ?
To my knowledge, it does not feature a modification in the RETARD callout logic (?) which is the purpose of the recommendation 170/A/07.