The people who should be hung out to dry are the policy makers, and not those who carried out what flowed inevitably from those policies.
I didn’t want to comment; after all, the report is essentially a compilation of Pprune comments from this and other threads. That is, not one word is a revelation.
One thing is clear; the criticism levelled at these individuals is justified to a greater or lesser extent.
But, today, there will be many confused people in MoD. They will read the 5 names of their colleagues and think “But we’re instructed to do far worse on a daily basis – in fact, it’s the only way to advancement”. Ministers, the Chief of Defence Procurement and his (PE/DPA) Director General responsible for Nimrod are all on record supporting disciplinary action against staff that refused to act this way. Not one of these people is referred to directly, although there is a barely concealed swipe at CDP, which makes me think Mr Haddon-Cave wanted to criticise more people but was reigned in.
I’ll take one example from the ten, as he’s the only one I’ve ever spoken to. General Cowan. He is castigated for the way he introduced a 20% “saving” in 1999. What Mr Haddon-Cave says is, strictly speaking, correct.
But, General Cowan will be feeling aggrieved this morning. He’ll be thinking “Why is the report baselined at 1999? Why not mention the Halifax Savings of 1987 – 33% off aircraft support at a single stroke?" When AMSO was formed in the early 90s the crucial area charged with maintaining airworthiness / safety took 3 successive cuts of 27%. This may seem a long time ago, but in the context of Nimrod, Chinook, Hercules and others it is precisely when decisions were being made that had a direct effect on the accidents.
I agree with Jacko. The depth and breadth of the report are ground breaking, but there are many in MoD, Ministers, Senior Officers and Civilians, past and present, who will be breathing a sigh of relief that they belong to the protected species. I know one man who’ll be thinking “Perhaps I shouldn’t have waived that Critical Design Review and disciplined my staff for wanting to implement airworthiness regs – hope they don’t re-open the inquest”.
This is infinitely worse than anything in the report. Why do I say that? Because, despite all the justified criticism therein, the indications are that the named individuals were trying to do a good job, but incompetence, circumstances and directives prevented it. But in the cases I mention, having been confronted directly and been told airworthiness was being compromised, these others made quite deliberate decisions to leave aircraft or equipment unsafe.