This was tragic, and we must be sympathetic to the families of those who have lost loved ones, and to those whose lives have been blighted by this avoidable event.
From the reported ages of the 3 crewmembers, it would seem that they were all of a similar experience level. There is potentially a systemic flaw here. Even in the mid-late 70s when I was on the Puma fleet (and then, mostly single pilot ops, except for NI) a junior pilot would not normally be crewed with a 'junior' crewman. And this was before anybody had thought of a formal concept of CRM. If the jp started to step off the line, the experienced crewman would exert his influence: regardless of the rank gradient. It doesn't always work: I can think of another avoidable tragic low-flying Puma accident where it should have.
Incidentally, the training progression then for pilots was:
OCU: 30 hrs (35 for a first-tourist straight from AFTS) out after 6 weeks with D cat/Limited Combat Ready.
Squadron: Initial check, then 3 months of flying on tasking with a QHI/LTC; after 3 months, allowed off on simple tasks (like the Catterick one) as Pi/c, but with a SP as Det Cdr and Authoriser. After 6 months on the squadron re-cat to C/CR (the 'working standard') and, of course, still learning. With luck and a bit of hard work, one could aspire to becoming a 'B' cat.
It is unfortunate that the Press has not taken the trouble to find out about the current training process and presented the pilot as being on his 'first flight without an instructor'.
Lastly, I think it inexcusable that the audio-visual material of the final moments of the flight was released to public broadcast. This was, in my opinion, an abominable lapse of taste and judgement by those concerned with its publication. It should be pointed out to HM Coroners, senior Service personnel, and to the Press and Broadcasting authorities, that this material is analagous to the CVR data, which, if my memory serves correctly, has confidentiality protected by one of the Ottawa Conventions.
I am sure that all the potential systemic flaws in this accident will have been looked at and mitigated well before the Coroner's findings. Quite simply, this accident was a rare lapse of professionalism: it is a sad and severe blow to a truly professional, hard working, and overstretched Support Helicopter force.
Last edited by idle stop; 28th Oct 2009 at 09:28.