742;
Accountability is the absolute key issue. I worked in a regional airlines’ flight operations management for 7 years, and there is no doubt in my mind that “the system” has been deliberately designed to upstream control to the majors while keeping accountability for operations and maintenance downstream at the regional.
Marketing, scheduling of the aircraft (the life blood of an airline) and financial control all reside on the major airline side of what is, literally, an accountability firewall. Operations and maintenance – those are kept on the regional side of the firewall.
And the problem is developing within the major airlines themselves. The system of holding companies and code sharing agreements needs to be addressed so that accountability for the quality of the operation flows from every airplane in an airline’s colors all the way to the board room at the top of the corporate structure.
I suggest that you try to get hold of the
Commission of Inquiry Into the Air Ontario Crash at Dryden, Ontario - Final Report Volume III, (Parts six through nine),
The Hon. Virgil Moshansky, Commissioner, 1992. The points you make are clearly detailed in this Inquiry as are the failures of the Regulator, (Transport Canada) to oversee this operation and the relationship between the mainline carrier and the regional carrier. While much has changed in terms of regulatory reform, we are again reducing that under SMS, and entering a period of extended "deregulation of flight safety" where the lack of oversight by Transport is targeted is once again occurring. Hopefully there are enough of the "old school" left to intervene where necessary.
The Dryden Report is difficult to find. I am unsure whether that is by design or by lack of interest. Give it a try as it is well worth reading.