This article from
The National Post about security and El Al's philosophy shows why you shouldn't need to arm the pilots. There is enough to do flying the a/c safely without having to perform the duties of an armed guard also.
U.S. air safety measures have nothing on El Al
World's toughest airline: Israeli agents focus on the person, not the weapon
Martin Himel
National Post
TEL AVIV - The men responsible for El Al's reputation as the world's toughest airline are not impressed with the anti-terrorism measures Western carriers have put in place since Sept. 11.
"The feeling you have now in the United States is they are not professional, that they really don't know what they are doing," says Shlomo Dror, a spokesman for Israel's Defence Ministry.
"Today, I could [hijack] an airplane in the United States without any problem."
Israeli security officials dismiss the sudden obsession with searching passengers for potential weapons, from nail clippers to box cutters to pen knives. Nor do they worry about steel cutlery.
There are already numerous weapons on board an aircraft, they say. Take a bottle of duty-free liquor. Smash it and you have a weapon. Sharpen your credit card and you can slit a throat.
These tactics were not dreamed up by terrorists, but by El Al security personnel.
To beat terrorism, you must think like a terrorist. "Then you can have some answers," explains Mr. Dror, a former senior El Al security official.
The Israeli airline uses four lines of defence, concentrating on psychology more than weaponry.
First is the reservation system. It is linked directly to Israel's intelligence computer network, which scans all names and reviews credit card numbers. It red flags passengers who pay cash and notes any suspected links to terrorists.
Thanks to this pre-flight checking, Israeli security officials often know whom to look for before passengers show up at the airport.
At the check-in desk, a security official asks the kind of questions used by other airlines. "Did you pack your bags? What is the purpose of your trip? Are you bringing any presents or parcels for someone?"
The difference is the El Al official has been trained to note the passengers' body language, how they answer the questions, any inconsistencies or nervousness. Most of those questioned pass through in less than a minute. Five percent get a more thorough review.
That was the experience of Jonas Grandburg, who took an El Al flight to Paris recently.
The smartly dressed Swedish businessman found himself being interrogated by a petite young Israeli woman.
Taking him aside and putting his bag on a table, she asked for documents to prove he was on business in Israel. She wanted contact names, hotel receipts and the address of his Paris office. After 10 minutes, she checked the details with her superiors while Mr. Grandburg waited anxiously.
Five minutes later, she returned and handed back his passport and business documents. She did not inspect his luggage.
If Mr. Grandburg's story did not check out, or if there was a concern he might be unknowingly carrying a bomb or a weapon, he would have been thoroughly searched, though this rarely happens. Any problems are usually detected by the questioning.
In the past three decades there have been several attempts to blow up El Al aircraft. The explosives have always been discovered and, in the past 30 years, no El Al plane has been hijacked.
As for Mr. Grandburg, the experience was unsettling but he agrees it was necessary.
"It feels a bit insulting. Your integrity is a bit violated having to answer all these questions and showing this documentation," he says. "On the other hand, it is only a small price to pay, considering the consequences it could have."
Behind the scenes, Israeli security constantly tries to pierce the airline's defences, devising ever more ingenious methods to slip a "bomb" or a weapon on board an aircraft.
If they succeed, the security official who missed the weapon is dismissed. There are no second chances.
As the final and most obvious line of defence, there are air marshals on all El Al flights.
But, says Mr. Dror, if a marshal has to intervene to stop a hijacking, the system has failed.
Israeli air marshals are not simply airborne policemen. They must have served three or four years in a combat unit and be in excellent physical condition. They must be able to fire three bullets and hit a target 15 metres away in one second.
"That is very quick," says Mr. Dror. "If someone should get up with something in his hand and say, 'I'm [hijacking] the airplane,' he should know a minute later, a second later, he is dead."
U.S. airline security experts contend the Israeli system might work for a small carrier like El Al, but would be too complex and expensive to be applied across the entire North American continent.
Israeli experts argue that if the security procedures are done properly, a jumbo jet with 350 passengers can be cleared and boarded within an hour and a half, less than the current wait at Chicago's O'Hare airport.
I believe it was exactly the same argument after the Gore Commission on airline security that was waived because it would be "too much" as that mentioned above in the last paragraph. What price security and remember September 11th!