I think it is worth translating your link jcjeant.
Les dossiers noirs du transport aérien
Complexity
The blockage of the Pitot probes is a defect (not a failure) linked to the architecture of these probes and their obsolete certification standards. After the drama of flight AF 447, Airbus, EASA and all others have reminded pilots that in the case of inconsistency in the airspeed indications, they must follow procedures QRH 2.21 thru 2.23b, FCOM 3.02.34. This gives a false idea of the complexity of the problem. In fact, induced failures which succeed in cascade lead to the execution of 9 ECAM procedures (screen), 1 QRH procedure (check list) and 2 paper procedures (Annex 5 of the BEA report). This is not a simulator session and this kind of event does not always happen during a smooth flight in a blue sky. As Murphy would say, it can also happen during the crossing of an active ITCZ (inter tropical convergence zone), in turbulence, during CB avoidance manoeuvres. From memory, the PF will apply CLB thrust and 5 degrees up of attitude, approximate values that will be corrected on page 4 of the procedure in question if we are lucky to get that far, while the Christmas tree lights (alarms in all types) accompanied by the sweet music of different horns. To make it, there may be also a false STALL alarm, which must be obeyed by following the instructions in force, a not so comfortable situation but dealt at Air France by a complementary abnormal procedure that will require additional feverish research. Previously, the average pilot, who is neither a test driver or Buck Danny, will have, in an extremely busy working "atmosphere", applied max thrust and an forward pressure on the side stick. How, in this "atmosphere" to distinguish between buffeting and turbulence? To the complexity of the systems, you add the complexity of the procedures!
It is very easy to leave the flight envelop in these conditions ...
(This is not the scenario in the final minutes of flight AF447. No one knows what happened)