Nuclear Deterrent

[Modern Elmo]

The mixed load option:

[I][/INo Non-Nukes on Ballistic Missile Submarines

Posted by David A. Fulghum at 3/6/2008 10:36 AM CST

Congress won't yield in its determination that U.S. submarines won’t carry a mix of nuclear and conventionally-armed ballistic missiles at the same time. They don’t want a nuclear war triggered by the launch of a conventionally-armed missile from a submarine.

So for the time being, at least, the whole discussion with Congress about a conventional Trident [missile] modification is dead. Nonetheless, four SSGNs have been converted to non-nuclear missions, and the concept of using a sea-based system is not ruled out, says Gen. Kevin Chilton, chief of U.S. Strategic Command. “It’s just that the proposal that there will be a mixed load out, is something that Congress is not comfortable with.”

The initial proposal had 14 Ohio-class SSBNs each loaded with 2 conventional D-5 missiles (with each carrying four kinetic warheads) and 22 nuclear missiles. From as much as 4,000 mi. away, the conventional missile could hit early warning radars, terrorist camps and enemy leaders. For military planers it would cover the initial one-hour gap in responding to a threat anywhere on the globe. However, the ambiguity produced by an unexpected launch, particularly in an edgy foe, is obvious.

“Congress has made it clear that the [conventional, submarine-based missile] is a capability they would not like to see deployed” as part of the long-range, rapid strike program, Chilton says. “But we were unsuccessful in getting [lawmakers] comfortable with the Trident approach. [They rejected the idea of] using the CTM proposal of a mixed [nuclear, conventional] loadout [on a submarine],” he says.

However, StratCom hasn’t stopped pursuing the capability. “We’re learning more as we continue to develop the technologies we need for prompt global strike that could be land-based,” he says.

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... A new deterrent posture could include conventional ballistic missiles (CBMs), a new factor in deterrence, but so far more dangerous to careers than to adversaries. Asked about CBMs at the Space and Missile Defense Conference in Huntsville, Ala., in August, Marine Corps Gen. James E. Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, responded: "You want to see the scar tissue?"

The case for CBMs is strong. "The only systems that we have that can get to the fight in minutes have been nuclear warheads," Cartwright says. "Is that prudent? It is relevant, in that the enemy believes we will use it." Air Force Gen. (ret.) Eugene Habiger, involved in the CBM effort, notes, however, "a 1,000-lb. conventional warhead with a few meters CEP (circular error probable) has the same effect as 50 kilotons at 3,000 ft."

CBM, Habiger told the Omaha conference, "was a great idea. The Navy calculated that they could provide 100 CBMs for $500 million. But Stratcom didn't get the regional [commanders-in-chief] involved to persuade the secretaries of State and Defense that we needed it, and that was a great way to kill it."

However, as Cartwright noted, the initial CBM--Conventional Trident--is being brought to a point where it could be fielded within 18 months (as Congress directed). Also, tests being conducted in "four to five months" will demonstrate technologies to deal with "ambiguity issues"--the problem of demonstrating that a missile launch is not nuclear. "That's seen as more of a way forward." ...

U.S. Rethinks Nuclear Strategy | AVIATION WEEK