Roger Coppid;
Quote:
is there iny info out there about the comparison between incidents such as deep/short/hard landings, stick-shakes, over-speeds, over-banking, bank angle on landing both with or without the use of automation.
Yes, all these events and more would be in an airline's FOQA/FDA/FDM (as the term might be) Program.
These are serious events which, if seen in trends, are precursors to an accident. The intent of a flight data monitoring program is to learn about these events and take preventative measures before an accident occurs.
But FOQA data must be used intelligently and with great integrity and comprehension to deliver on its promise of enhanced flight safety.
I have learned that senior management of a large airline has stated to its flight data people that the long landings being reported on the B777 are the result of its "big wing". Such a view is, in my opinion, an enabling one, excusing long landings, for whatever conceivable reason.
One supposes that the corollary to that view is, (because the wing is what it is), there is therefore nothing to be done and landings over 3000 to 4000ft down the runway are somehow acceptable (normalizing the deviance). The other excuse offered is, the runways that B777's typically use are "long".
Such a response (or denial) to the flight data places the organization at undue risk and subsequent liabilities because the "accident was in the data" before it occurred. The QANTAS overrun at Bangkok years ago is one example. The organization changed as a result of the accident and has championed flight data analysis as a primary preventative safety tool; in my opinion, QANTAS is a fine example of a learning organization which has been able to balance economics with safety.
Flight data monitoring programs will tell the airline if there are stick-shaker events which go unreported, hard landings, over-banking, (> 35deg), overspeeds and how the automation performs in comparison with manual flight.
Critically, the data derived from the QARs must be believed, (that is not always the case), kept confidential but never used to police or punish pilots. Ninety-nine percent of flight safety is about "what", not "who".
A "distributed archive" program was begun in the US some time ago, where de-identified flight data was made available to various airlines under a desire to share data to enhance safety. The idea was to see if carriers were experiencing the same issues. I don't know the present status of the program but such an approach, (very difficult to implement - those involve did a huge amount of work over a long time) goes directly to your question about industry experience.
FOQA programs are expensive to start and maintain, and the argument from the beancounters is always, "what does it produce that justifies the cost?" I have actually been told that the flight safety department was a "profit center" under some corporate business models. Such an approach reveals a high degree of ignorance first about aviation and second about how flight safety work is done. Some think that wearing reflective vests on the ramp is "doing flight safety" while others that I know have a full comprehension of the safety tools available to them, know their worth and are willing to invest the time and resources.
As always, the CEO leads and his or her "knights", (managers) will ride out and do and say exactly what the CEO wants. So if the CEO is ignorant about how to do aviation safety, the organization will likely be ignorant. All safety people have had experience pushing rope at one time or another. Some organizations learn by honest assessment of their strengths and weaknesses, others take their long-term success for granted, ostensibly waiting until an accident to teach them.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
If the shoe fits, wear it!
