Come again? I am an engineer. I believe I made that clear.
I am also a pilot
You said:
I fly professionally and have spent many years as a professional "engineer" (mechanic)
So are you a mechanic, an "engineer" or an engineer? A mechanic is not an engineer.
Quote:
You're in no position to state what the case was or wasn't.
Nobody is
I think the NTSB are in a better position than any of us. But regardless of that, I'm glad you've accepted that you cannot rationally say that a missile hit TWA800.
Well yes, actually, there is...firstly a flight engineer who turns off the CWT pumps and sees a bright amber low pressure light telling him to do so, and secondly
A flight crew member acting correctly is maybe a 1e-6 pfh function, which is approx 1e-5 over a flight. A light bulb is about a 1e-5 pfh function. <1e-5 pfh doesn't support any case worse than a major safety case - dry-running of pumps in tanks is now a catastrophic safety case. This is the reason why older types have had automatic centre tank pump shut off retrofitted (737NG) and why centre tank minimum fuel procedures have been adopted.
secondly...while the FQIS was "implicated," this has occurred with little more than ancillary "evidence."
I'm glad you've accepted that FQIS was implicated. And as we've discussed on the 747-100 there is no intrinsic safety barrier preventing high energy from entering the tank through the FQIS harnessses.
Actually that's not true, particularly if there's an explosion and the tank is breached.
I didn't talk about a tank rupture, I talked about the explosion risk. A tank full of vapour and empty of fuel is a worse case than a tank not empty of fuel. More component failures may result an explosion, potential across more structure has the capability to arc.
The additional volume of the empty tank occupied by the small extra amount of vapor mixture won't contribute nearly as significantly to the explosion and conflagration as a partially full tank will after rupture; the partial fuel load then vaporizes and adds immensely to the energy of the explosion and the ensuing fire.
I really don't understand this point, you haven't shown that a missile hit TWA800 and there's no evidence that the tank was ruptured from the outside. The contribution of a full or not-full tank to a missile explosion is irrelevent until you've established there was a missile.
Let's ignore the fact that the NTSB was never able to establish, let alone prove that an explosive fuel mixture existed in the CWT, and take it on faith that there was such a mixture present. Set aside that a competent FE missed two pumps on, and ignored the amber low fuel (indicating low fuel pressure from those pumps) lights. Ignore the lack of evidence of any ignition source. Let's ignore the hundreds of witnesses who saw a streak of light originate at the surface, and proceed to the aircraft where they saw an explosion. Let's ignore the fact that even the military ballistics report claims being inconclusive and not having adequte information, or that it was part of the government documentation (much of which changed from the early statements and reports, to it's final itineration). Let's ignore that such an event has never occurred before, or that the substantiation from reports such as the previously cited SFAR88 document can only cite irrelevant events using different fuel and circumstances, and that the report lumps in bombs, lightening strikes, and unknown causes in an attempt to link them to the TWA800 event. Let's ignore the witness drawings, the witnesses not allowed to testify, the evidence which was *misplaced,* and the recanted testimonies from some notable and authoritative sources (including weapons experts at China Lake). What we're really left with is a coverup of a shootdown of TWA 800.
Neither the NTSB nor anyone can prove a theory. Vapour in the tanks was clearly above the lower flammability limit, it had the capability to support combustion. The temperature in the tank was 38-52 deg C. The lower flammability limit of Jet A was 35.8 deg C.
Dry-running fuel pumps was not necessarily the source of ignition, but the pumps rely on pressure switches, harnesses, light bulbs and a fallible human to shut them off. As Boeing themselves have documented, it's well above 1e-9 per flight hour.
FQIS is a potential ignition source.
TURIN has helpfully discussed the witnesses.
Now let's consider the facts: Boeing themselves have submitted systems fault tree analysis that shows that the probability of 747-100 FQIS introducing high energy into the tank is 1e-6 pfh. It needs to be 1e-9 fh. This alone is compelling evidence that the 747-100 was an unsafe, flawed design and that it was only a matter of time before a centre fuel tank explosion occured.
Idon't frequent PPRuNe very often and the main reason is the kind of stuff which has littered the rest of this thread culminating in the inevitable PPRuNe style name calling and sh*t throwing.
What name-calling? This is a technical debate, what's wrong with it?