S41 - an excellent synopsis of the policy to capability process and its implications..... guess where I used to work?
WEBF - actually, I was only trolling. But, since you bit:
That strike capability cannot exist in isolation from the rest of the fleet.
is at variance with the briefings given by SRO(CS), who sees CVF as a self-supporting asset that would go where the JFACC needs it rather than operating as part of a carrier battle group, and with the previous 1SLs similar statements. Maybe you have a better source than them?
Think of logistics.
is a dangerous statement for anyone advocating carrier-based over land-based air for expeditionary ops to make. Let's not discuss classified or commercial stuff on here, but I take it you have seen the assessments of how long the carrier could operate an air group for once it is cut off from a supporting airfield? And exactly how was it that the LM support contract was going to get urgent spares to JSF afloat?
Amphibious operations demand at least a measure of air superiority, which means fighters.
And tankers, and AEW, and presumably the ops would also want air ISTAR, AT support etc. Hope there's room for all that on CVF.
an enemy will seek to exploit any weakness, and inflicting attrition on logistic shipping, escorts, minehunters etc could well be an attractive option.
Indeed. And another reason why CVF only gives us a fairly niche capability: the ability to do limited strike ops for a limited period against not too serious an enemy. A great tool to have in your golf bag (see the hideously outdated SDR's now largely discredited concept of 'Focussed Intervention'), but as S41 points out, a tool of fairly narrow utility.