WEBF,
I wonder where you get the idea that the idea that the Treasury are so interested in micro-managing the MoD's programme spending that (with the exception of Trident, where the numbers are so big - c. £78bn / 20 years) it is going to dictate the answer beyond the budgetary envelope. Simply put, money is given to MoD to achieve the stated goals - and it is up to the MoD how to spend it to achieve the agreed goals - so savings in the RN may end up spent on the Army or the RAF, and will do before the money heads back to the Treasury. (And before you tell me that I'm ignorant of the facts, I'm virtually certain that I've been closer to the process at HM Treasury than you have.) With apologies for the length, here are my thoughts.
The 2010 Defence Review needs to do two things: first, produce a prioritised list of what we want the military to do in 2015; and in 2020; and an idea of what capabilities we want in 2025. The political key is clearly winning "the war" in Afghanistan, with broader capabilities to fight "a war" secondary.
Second, we take the budgetary envelope out to 2015 (ie, the next Parliament) and a reasonably credible best guess out to 2020, and draw the line on the first list based on how mcuh we are collectively prepared to spend as a nation. (And no, I don't think that the Tories will increase defence spending at all - indeed, they're doomed to cut spending given their pledges on the NHS and education.)
Against this backdrop, senior RN types are right to be worried: their principal blue-water symmetrical capabilities are not those that will be used in Afghanistan before 2015 (the uber-commendable Bootnecks notwithstanding), and in a rigorous prioritisation, CVF doesn't make the grade. More Type 45s may, and replacement FF/DD certainly will - as long as they are cheaper than the T45 procurement debacle - see
Providing Anti Air Warfare Capability: the Type 45 destroyer. So partnering with France and Italy on FREMM could be a sensible way forward. But CVF? Never going to make the grade -
AT THE CURRENT LEVEL OF SPENDING.
The RAF will also see a rebalancing of investment towards transport and rotary wing assets, and if we can find anyone to buy some more Typhoons, then we may well see a reduction in their numbers, too. Tranche 3B is probably dead, and as a light blue person, that's too bad, but inevitable.
CVF's demise would have a significant impact on the RAF, too. If CVF dies, then the argument to keep Harrier in service dies too, so we would probably lose the GR9s by 2012. Looking forward, this implies no need for the compromise of Dave-B, so Dave-A or Dave-C is much more likely to replace Tornado GR4 from 2018/20, with the RAF having two FJ fleets - Typhoon in the Air-to-Air / Swing role, and Dave doing strike.
Having spoken to lots of thoughtful RN people recently, the only credible scenario in which we need a carrier when (a) the US can't be guaranteed to turn up and (b) there is unlikely to be HNS within range, is if we lose the Falklands and have to retake them.
So if the answers are (i) "Buy CVF + escorts" or (ii) "don't lose the Falklands in the first place", then equipping RAF aircraft with a robust anti-shipping capability to sink any putative Argentinian invasion fleet is going to be a darn sight cheaper than CVF. And said thoughtful RN types agree (albeit with long faces).
Hence my point: whatever you think of the CVF design (I favour a CTOL solution with organic AEW and C4ISTAR if we're going to bother at all), the simple reality in the current - and any credible future budgetary climate - is that it is not widely employable enough to be useful enough to justify the costs.
Worse, if the RN presses on regardless with the CVF programme, it will be at the cost of the really useful FF/DD forces, and we will end up with a one-trick pony - a single CVF battle group. Few FF/DD off to do other things (no spare 45s for one thing, 23s mostly doing ASW for the CVF), and a much reduced worldwide capability.... for what? For the ability to send a CVF battle group off to fight....? Ah right, no-one (except Argentina).
Sorry for the length, but without a significant increase in the overall budgetary envelope, I don't see it going any other way, for as long as we wish to continue in Afghanistan.
I would be delighted to have the above refuted and be told why I'm wrong: N-a-B, OA, Evalu8ter, WEBF, over to you.
S41