PEI_3721, an interesting link, thank you.
Having read through all these incidents, it did seem to me that in most of the cases there were major flaws in the
execution of the various procedures... Even if there had been mega-briefs, it'd have all gone to worms anyway. In fact, the authors of the paper thought the same:
All of the errors should have been detected with self or cross-crew monitoring. These require application of CRM skills involving communication for sharing mental models, crosschecking facts and understandings, and monitoring the situation that must include both the flight path and personal and crew understandings.
The approaches were all NP, sometimes a late change from an ILS. If you're going to agree on just one thing, I'd have thought the descent point would have been it...? Several of the approaches went below MDA without an adequate visual reference or any sort of altitude/distance checks - seems SOPs went out of the window.