The accident report has been out for a while.
http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/677.pdf
It was a nice sunny day. It appears that the captain handed control over to the F/O at 2500' on descent. The F/O did not want to fly the approach saying that he didn't have the same experience as the captain and that he was not confident about his own ability to fly this approach(which was odd because he had 2400 hrs PIC on C-130's).
The captain insisted that the F/O fly the approach. The F/O positioned the aircraft high on approach less than 3 nm from the threshold at least 50 knots above ref speed while not configured for landing.
The captain took control of the aircraft to configure, with the flaps and gear coming down above their limiting speed.
In order to prevent selection of reverse thrust or less than flight idle blade angle in flight, there are two protections. The first is an always fixed mechanical stop, which is where the power levers stop when they are moved fully aft in flight(closing the power levers). The power levers can be moved aft of this stop by lifting the levers up and over this stop as is normally done on landing. There is a secondary protection which is a solenoid operated stop which is designed to only be available in flight in order to prevent intentional movement of the power levers into reverse(or anywhere in the ground control range with its corresponding lower blade angles) in flight. This stop is removed once on the ground allowing ground blade angles (such as reverse).
There is slight movement(by design apparently) aft of the mechanical stop to reach the solenoid stop allowing a slight increase in drag. Therefore according to hearsay, pilots had been known to intentionally lift the power levers and move them aft of the mechanical stop to the solenoid stop on occasion. This activity was prohibited.
There was a known abnormality in the secondary solenoid stop system(not a certification requirement when the aircraft was designed by the way) where it was deactivated for 16 seconds after the gear was selected down. An airworthiness directive with a future compliance date(to modify the system) had been issued after a well publicized incident to the same type being operated by Luxair. The Kish Airlines plane was unmodified at the time.
When the Captain selected the power levers aft of the mechanical stop soon after gear down selection, the prop blades moved rapidly into an undetermined ground range blade angle resulting in a rapid aircraft pitchdown.
The power levers were rapidly moved forward in an effort to correct the situation. One prop moved slowly to the flight range but the other stayed in full reverse to impact.
The report says that a CVR transcript is attached but it is not available from this link. If anyone has the transcript, please post.