Originally Posted by HarryMann
Early wing drop/loss of symmetry/roll control not commented upon
Basic aerodynamics, really.
I was trying to get at what was just pointed out...with a less dramatic rotation and thus more time/'feel' for recognition of config. error, could perhaps this a/c have also become airborne, as did the Lanzarotte flight that made the same error.
Of course, retrospective and academic... however, I canot help reflecting on the crew, who seem to have lost all sense of 'dangeritis' and situational awareness.
Running late, in and of itself, may have been the real killer in this accident. As well as what appears to have been a rather unfortunate crew combination.
The Captain seems to have self-stressed himself over the delay (unless there are hidden company stressors?) and not rise above it.
The FO did not appear to be compensating, indeed, becoming complicit in a joint exercise to leave the ground asap, re-arrange social/family life, regardless of duties, procedures and normal cockpit responsibilities.
Sorry, I cannot ignore those points, and am particularly disturbed at the emphasis placed on Maintenance Staff (a singleton it seems!) early in the investigation, when it was patently obvious within days, that there were serious problems with:
a) The RAT probe heater documentation & suitable Quick Access troubleshooting procedures
b) Design of the whole TOWS system, being interwoven into other sysetms, rather than completely stand-alone.
c) A poorly documented MEL item for this aircraft