just read an update on the ntsb investigation...seems that both piper and copter were on radar and that newerk asked teterboro to resolve a possible conflict
urge you to read the following:
NTSB ADVISORY
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National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
August 14, 2009
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NTSB ISSUES UPDATE ON ITS INVESTIGATION INTO THE MIDAIR
COLLISION OVER THE HUDSON RIVER
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In its continuing investigation of the midair collision of
an air tour helicopter and a small plane over the Hudson
River on Saturday, the National Transportation Safety Board
has developed the following factual information:
On August 8, 2009, at 11:53 a.m. EDT, a Eurocopter AS 350 BA
(N401LH) operated by Liberty Helicopters and a Piper PA-32R-
300 (N71MC) operated by a private pilot, collided in midair
over the Hudson River near Hoboken, New Jersey. The
certificated commercial pilot and five passengers onboard
the helicopter were killed. The certificated private pilot
and two passengers onboard the airplane were also killed.
Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight
plans were filed for either flight. The local sightseeing
helicopter flight was conducted under the provisions of 14
Code of Federal Regulations Part 136. The personal airplane
flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of
Federal Regulations Part 91.
The helicopter departed West 30th Street Heliport (JRA), New
York, New York, for a sightseeing tour at 11:52 a.m. The
airplane departed Teterboro Airport (TEB), Teterboro, New
Jersey, at 11:49 a.m.; destined for Ocean City Municipal
Airport (26N), Ocean City, New Jersey. The airplane pilot
requested an en route altitude of 3500 feet.
According to preliminary radar data, the helicopter turned
south from JRA and climbed to 1,100 feet, with a transponder
code of 1200. According to witnesses, the pilot of the
helicopter had transmitted a position report of "Stevens
Point" (Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, New
Jersey) on the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF),
123.05.
On the day of the accident, Teterboro Air Traffic Control
Tower staff consisted of five controllers. At the time of
the accident, the tower was staffed with two controllers:
one controller was working ground control, local control,
and arrival radar, and was also acting as the controller in
charge of the facility. The second controller was working
the flight data/clearance delivery position. Two other
controllers were on break and the front line manager had
left the facility at about 1145.
At 1148:30, the Teterboro tower controller cleared the
airplane for takeoff on frequency 119.50. The first radar
target for the airplane was recorded at 1149:55 as the
flight departed runway 19.
The tower controller advised the airplane and the pilot of
another helicopter operating in the area of each other and
instructed the pilot of the airplane to remain at or below
1,100 feet. At this time, the tower controller initiated a
non-business-related phone call to Teterboro Airport
Operations. The airplane flew southbound until the
controller instructed its pilot to turn left to join the
Hudson River. At 1152:20 the Teterboro controller instructed
the pilot to contact Newark on a frequency of 127.85; the
airplane reached the Hudson River just north of Hoboken
about 40 seconds later. At that time there were several
aircraft detected by radar in the area immediately ahead of
the airplane, including the accident helicopter, all of
which were potential traffic conflicts for the airplane. The
Teterboro tower controller, who was engaged in a phone call
at the time, did not advise the pilot of the potential
traffic conflicts. The Newark tower controller observed air
traffic over the Hudson River and called Teterboro to ask
that the controller instruct the pilot of the airplane to
turn toward the southwest to resolve the potential
conflicts. The Teterboro controller then attempted to
contact the airplane but the pilot did not respond. The
collision occurred shortly thereafter. A review of recorded
air traffic control communications showed that the pilot did
not call Newark before the accident occurred.
The helicopter departed from the 30th Street Heliport at
1152 for what was planned to be a 12-minute tour. The
initial part of the tour was to be flown outside class B
airspace, so the pilot was not required to contact air
traffic control before or after departure. The first radar
target for the helicopter was detected by Newark radar at
about 1152:27, when the helicopter was approximately mid-
river west of the heliport and climbing through 400 feet.
According to recorded radar data, the helicopter flew to the
west side of the river, and then turned southbound to follow
the Hudson. According to Liberty Helicopters management,
this was the expected path for the tour flight. The
helicopter continued climbing southbound until 1153:14, when
it and the airplane collided at 1,100 feet.
As noted above, immediately after the Teterboro tower
controller instructed the airplane to contact Newark tower
on frequency 127.85, the Newark controller called the
Teterboro controller to request that they turn the airplane
to a heading of 220 degrees (southwest) and transfer
communications on the aircraft. As the Newark controller
was providing the suggested heading to the Teterboro
controller, the pilot of the airplane was acknowledging the
frequency change to the Teterboro controller. The Teterboro
controller made two unsuccessful attempts to reach the
pilot, with the second attempt occurring at 1152:50. At
1152:54, 20 seconds prior to the collision, the radar data
processing system detected a conflict between the airplane
and the helicopter, which set off aural alarms and a caused
a "conflict alert" indication to appear on the radar
displays at both Teterboro and Newark towers. During
interviews both controllers stated that they did not recall
seeing or hearing the conflict alert. At 1153:19, five
seconds after the collision, the Teterboro controller
contacted the Newark controller to ask about the airplane,
and was told that the pilot had not called. There were no
further air traffic control contacts with either aircraft.
The role that air traffic control might have played in this
accident will be determined by the NTSB as the investigation
progresses. Any opinions rendered at this time are
speculative and premature.
Radar data and witness statements indicate that the aircraft
collided at 1,100 feet in the vicinity of Stevens Point.
Most of the wreckage fell in to the Hudson River; however,
some small debris from the airplane, including the right
main landing gear wheel, fell on land within the city limits
of Hoboken. The collision was witnessed by numerous people
in the area of the accident and was immediately reported to
local emergency responders.
The helicopter was recovered on August 9, 2009. Most of the
helicopter components were accounted for at the scene, with
the exception of the main rotor and transmission. The
airplane was recovered on August 11, 2009. Most of the
airplane components were accounted for at the scene, with
the exception of both wings. The wreckages were subsequently
transported to a secure facility in Delaware.
The pilot of the airplane, age 60, held a private pilot
certificate, with ratings for airplane single-engine land,
airplane multiengine land and instrument airplane. His most
recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on May
14, 2009. At that time he reported a total flight experience
of 1,020 hours.
The pilot of the helicopter, age 32, held a commercial pilot
certificate, with ratings for rotorcraft helicopter and
instrument helicopter. His most recent FAA second-class
medical certificate was issued on June 16, 2009. At that
time he reported a total flight experience of 3,010 hours.
Digital photographs and a video recording taken by witnesses
to the accident have been provided to the NTSB. In
addition, a digital camera was recovered from the
helicopter. All of these were sent to the NTSB Vehicle
Recorders Laboratory in Washington, DC for further
examination. Global Positioning System units were recovered
from both aircraft and also forwarded to the NTSB Vehicle
Recorders Laboratory.
The recorded weather at TEB at 1151 was wind variable at 3
knots, visibility 10 miles, sky clear, temperature 24
degrees Celsius, dew point 7 degrees Celsius, altimeter
30.23 inches of mercury.
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NTSB Media Contact: Keith Holloway
(202) 314-6100