From the _Daily Mail_’s story (linked in slot#1 above), writer alludes to DL’s comments,
“... modern pilots spend the first part of training flying old-fashioned aircraft. ... then spend hours and hours in a simulator. ... however, their basic flying skills can become rusty. Instead, they become increasingly dependent on electronic aids and spend far too little time practising old-fashioned skills which they might need ...”
The above comment can be validated by a subtle, consistent over decades, instinctive, human response found in cases of mysterious airliner INFLIGHT UPSET.
For example, consider the traditional (Boeing-style) mysterious slice-to-vertical, Yaw X Roll = DIVE initial upsets (at CRZ and during APPCH). This is the exact moment when a pilot’s “instinct”, the human’s “common sense”, must be overcome -- by prior training: An unknown source induces a Yaw X Roll coupling; now, should this mishap-pilot pull back-stick to counter increasing nose-down motion during this rolling slice-to-vertical???
Below are the details [excerpts] from one typical pilot response to a typical Yaw x Roll entry into an unwanted rolling-dive. One engineer summarized the lessons by saying “don’t add Alpha during an unwanted-Beta event.” A Navy pilot related their upset mantra, “UNLOAD for CONTROL!”Footnote 315, AAR 99-01, pg 247: ... FDR did not record aileron and rudder ... inputs at either pilot position ... FDR recorded control column position [backstick] but did not identify which pilot(s) applied control column ... [Column Force NOT recorded].
AAR 99-01, Pg 248, second paragraph:
“... After about 1903:18 (about 5 seconds before ground impact), ... breathing and speech patterns recorded by the CVR indicated that he might have been exerting strong force on the controls (as he said “pull...pull...pull”). ... likely that the first officer made the first pilot control response to the upset event....
AAR 99-01
, Analysis, pg 256 2.2.2.4 “Likelihood of Recovery From a Rudder Reversal”
... the airplane began to roll to the left and ... nose down, and the control column position began to move slightly aft. Although the airplane’s left bank continued to increase ... motions and the aft control column pressure resulted in a slight increase ... to about 1.2 Gs ... the airplane ... below the airspeed at which the roll controls (aileron and spoilers) could counter the effects of the fully deflected rudder (crossover airspeed). Thus, from that time onward, it would have been impossible for the flight crew to regain roll control without increasing airspeed and/ or decreasing ... G load.
After the autopilot was disengaged ... left bank angle continued to increase and the control column position continued to move farther aft. ... increased to about 1.55 Gs. At that time, aft control column input would have been an instinctive pilot reaction to try to prevent ... nose down in a steep bank and maintain ... assigned ... altitude.
During the early seconds of the upset event, the pilots did not likely suspect that the event was anything other than a strong, but otherwise routine, wake turbulence encounter. They had no foreknowledge of a rudder reversal or rudder hardover or of the crossover airspeed phenomenon. Therefore, it is understandable that the pilots of USAir flight 427 would have, at least momentarily, attempted to maintain their assigned altitude by increasing control column back pressure. Further, it is extremely unlikely that the pilots would have been able to diagnose the relationship between airspeed, vertical G load, and the loss of control in the few seconds available to them after this back pressure brought the airplane below the crossover airspeed.326
The accident airplane’s FDR data indicated that the control column position generally continued to move farther aft as the event continued; the airplane continued to roll left and ... farther nose down, decelerated a few knots, and began to lose altitude. About 1903:08, as the airplane descended through about 5,700 feet msl, the stall warning stickshaker activated, indicating to the pilots that the aft column input was commanding an angle-of-attack near stall. However, by that time the airplane had attained an extreme attitude (about 70° left bank and more than 20° nose down), which would have been well beyond any attitude that the pilots would have experienced in air carrier operations. About 3 seconds later, when the control column reached its full aft position, the airplane’s bank ... beyond vertical (90°), and its pitch attitude had exceeded 50° below ...
Footnote #326 Boeing pilots who were evaluating the 737’s handling characteristics during post-accident flight tests identified a stronger-than-expected relationship between ... G load and the ability to overpower the roll induced by a full rudder deflection with full wheel input. The pilots reported that “there is some technique [required] between the G and the roll.”
[continuing on AAR pg 257]... in a rudder reversal scenario, the pilots of USAir flight 427 would have been struggling to cope with the rudder’s anomalous movements (in addition to the airplane’s extreme roll and pitch attitudes) when they also would have been surprised to discover that full left control wheel input was ineffective in countering the airplane’s steepening left roll. These factors combined to produce a flight situation and control problems that the pilots of USAir flight 427 had never before encountered in flight or training, including during stickshaker/stall recovery training. With this series of problems in the course of a few seconds, it is understandable that the crew was no longer responding in a manner that might have allowed recovery.[328]
Footnote #328: No reliable aerodynamic model exists for the 737’s flight characteristics in a stall; consequently, the Safety Board could not evaluate the possibility of recovery after activation of the stickshaker. The Safety Board notes, however, that if the pilots had reacted to the stickshaker by reducing aft control column pressure only enough to silence the stickshaker (as air carrier pilots are trained to do in a minimum altitude loss stall recovery), the airplane would have remained below the crossover airspeed for the existing vertical G load, and the pilots would not have regained control of the airplane.
During post-accident simulator tests, ... test subjects were able to recover from the USAir flight 427 upset ... when they applied a specific recovery technique ... forward control column ... to reduce G load and maintain a speed above the crossover airspeed) promptly when the event began. However, unlike the pilots of USAir flight 427, the simulator test subjects were aware of the circumstances of the accident, prepared for and expecting the upset event as it occurred, and coached through the recovery procedure.
When the simulator test subjects varied their responses from the specific techniques ... a successful recovery from the upset event became much less likely. Further, when ... tried to maintain altitude at the outset of the event ... speed decreased below the crossover airspeed, and recovery became unlikely....