BE: Pop has tried to close down reruns of same old on TSR.2, but you have revived the closet commie smear on Wilson, thus Lt.Callaghan,RN (Br.Pacific Fleet) and Maj.Healey,MC (Anzio Beachmaster), so:
TSR.2 was more thermionic than thermonuclear (see the open equipment bay at Cosford and weep for any readiness). When Elworthy became CAS, 1/9/63, O.R/AST.355 was to replace it with a VG system with (hybrid, on way to digital) kit, thus small, operable, affordable. Minister Thorneycroft saw TSR.2 as “an albatross round our necks (Healey) took the decision which would have had to be taken by (us. MoD was) writing (it) would have (to go) it was just that (Labour) took the opprobrium” B.Jackson/E.Bramall (CGS, 1979-82), The Chiefs, Brassey’s, 92, P361.
Here is the US State Dept.'s record of Wilson/LBJ meeting 7/12/64 to reconcile UK's parlous finances, US notions of a Multilateral Nuclear Force to give FRG a finger on its nuclear defence, and LBJ's desire for a UK presence in Vietnam:(PM:UK)"should have the best weapons (hence) desirability of buying (some from US). Quite apart from the economic benefits (UK) needed to maintain its R&D. This would have to be discussed (if UK) were to "go American" for certain weapons (US purchases would) reduce (Defence GNP share fr.)7½% to 5%. (Sec.Def McNamara: the) only way (was) to make hard decisions regarding equipment (and) destroy the myth that an arms industry is necessary for economic expansion. (US) could help (by) working out a cooperative R&D program. (UK was funding) certain projects which made no sense militarily (a) waste of money (-) TSR.2 (and) certain other projects. (US+UK) could benefit through greater integration (What) US needed (was) a firm (UK) policy of acting as a world power (then) US could help with the problem of the 5%” (of UK GNP. US) “could not be the gendarmes of the universe (what) others are doing has a great effect on what (US can do. UK has a) multiplying effect on our own role” For.Relations, V.XII, W.Europe, UK236, Memo., Conversation, Defense Problems. N’nl Archives & Records Admin., RG 59, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D272, MLF No.4.95/09/11; For.Relations,’64-68, Vol.XIII, W.Europe: Pres./PM 7-9/12/62.
Outcomes included: ditching polyglot (MLF) "poppycock" (ex-CIGS, Montgomery); keeping UK out of Vietnam, but in (for awhile) East of Suez with F-111K and CVA-01; nuclear co-operation which caused deployment of WE.177, Chevaline, Trident D-5; credit/fixed price for F-111K/C-130K/F-4M/Lance; and emergence of BAC Warton as UK's Military Aircraft Centre of Excellence on the back of Saudi Magic Carpet, which was part of McNamara's offset. HSAL Chairman Sir R.Dobson, who “lost work by our decision, gave a TV interview (putting) all the blame on Conservative “twerps” ‘(in) light of what has happened before (slippage/cost of UK types, it) is very difficult to quarrel with (Wilson)’” Healey,Memoirs,P272.
Elworthy,DSO,DFC, remained CAS, then 1/4/67-13/4/71 CDS, through the iterations F-111K/AFVG/UKVG until the Strike solution became (MRCA)Tornado. It is crankWright to persist that all this was done at Moscow's behest.