AF447

[Bergerie1]

I retired from active flying nearly 15 years ago, so I must not fall into the trap of thinking that more ‘stick and rudder’ flying is the only panacea for some of the problems that are manifesting themselves today. The last aircraft I flew was the B747-100/200 series!

Having been out of the loop for the last few weeks I have missed much of the discussion in PPRUNE about AF447. Now that I have had the chance to read back through some of the comments in this thread it seems to me that we are in danger of straying from the essentials.

First, we still don’t know what happened. There is some evidence that the Thales pitot tubes may have been at fault. Equally, I found Tim Vasquez’s analysis of the weather very informative (see www.weathergraphics.com/tim/af447/ ). But it is still all speculation.

Second, we must accept that however good aviation systems have become there are phenomena out there that exceed anything we can reasonably expect to survive. I have recently been sailing along the south coast of Ireland and have been reminded of the so-called ‘freak waves’ which can in some cases reach heights of 30 mtrs. It is worth remembering that, world-wide, over the last two decades, more than 200 super-carriers - cargo ships over 200m long - have been lost at sea. Eyewitness reports suggest many were sunk by high and violent walls of water that rose up out of calm seas. In the air, thunderstorms have the power to wreak similar havoc and must be treated with the greatest of respect.

Third, while reading this thread, the emphasis has shifted from what little is known about AF447 to a more general and very valid discussion on handling skills and automation. Harry Mann and PJ2 discussed stalling (6 Aug). My view is that current pilots do not know enough about the stall characteristics of their aircraft simply because this is treated at such a superficial during training. D.P. Davies (Handling the Big Jets, 3rd edition, page 110) suggests that aircraft achieve stall warning speeds on somewhere between 1 in 100 and 1 in 1000 flights; and stall speed on around 1 in 100,000 flights. When he wrote this book he also compared this with engine failure rates at that time of approx 1 in every 1000 flights en-route and 1 in 100,000 on take-off near V1. Since then, engines have become much more reliable but we still seem to have accidents caused by stalling. I would argue that, in modern training, more emphasis should be placed on handing stalls. I used to do C. of A. test flights on VC10s, B707s and B747s and was surprised at how many line pilots were so concerned about the safety of such manoeuvres. Clearly this was because of their comparative lack of exposure. The controlled conditions of a test flight are one thing, with few surprises. At FL350 on a dark night in turbulence it would be another matter, but I am sure more adequate simulator training would improve skills and increase confidence.

Fourth, with so much of the operation now being done using automation, it is clear that situational awareness and manual handling skills are declining. Phantom Driver (6 Aug) quite rightly says that he does not want to have a wild ride while some guy up front tries to polish up his handling skills. PJ2 (also on 6 Aug) highlights how little manual handling is done these days on the route and that next to NO time is spent on hand-flying on the simulator. He has also written at length (8 Aug) on the positive effect that modern automation has had on flight safety – if we went back to the old methods I am convinced that the accident rate would increase. Therefore, the issue is to decide what training is relevant to the modern situation. I think that PJ2, Harry Mann and Phantom Driver would all agree that what is needed is a thorough analysis of exactly what needs to be trained and then to revise conversion and recurrent training schedules so that they reflect more closely the current risks rather than those of yesteryear. I also think that more hand-flying in the simulator, with exercises specifically designed to increase confidence in taking over manually after unusual problems, would be of great benefit to increase confidence and manual skills. Perhaps, exercises of this sort would have helped the Turkish crew at Amsterdam.

Fifth, one final thought – this thread and many others following an accident tend to wear a ‘hair shirt’. Accidents always hit the headlines, and then we rake over the coals at great length. However, the quiet, competent saving of an extremely hazardous situation is hardly noticed – unless it happens under the gaze of the press on the Hudson River! Perhaps we should spend a little more time celebrating the remarkable things that are achieved by our colleagues every year.