Harry
Except to say that my impression was that you believed the a/c was stalling or nearly so at shaker, I don't disagree with any of your post.
The training by Colgan in this instance would seem to be appropriate. The shaker fired at the high bug speed, as it turns out, the a/c was fully capable at shaker of flying past it with power and no (or min.) alt. loss. The scenario that inspired the training, eg min loss/alt on approach, seems correct. Capt. Renslow remembered the hold altitude, but was in the weeds on attitude, power response, Prop pitch, and perhaps more. Had a different pilot corrected with nose down and applied power as trained, we wouldn't be discussing a small feeder's training syllabus.(IMO) The amount of nose down needn't have been commensurate with Stall recovery, just enough to cure the a/p's handling trim (Done because he didn't advance power with condition levers.)
My impression of this Captain's actions doesn't implicate the a/c or the line.
He forgot to increase power at conditon change, he had forgotten his ref speed had increased with anti ice select, he hadn't paid attention to Pitch increments with a/p; all this in VMC with the airport lights straight ahead, at correct altitude with a little flap. It takes an awful lot to start faulting Bombardier and Colgan. IMO. The article you refer to includes the Pinnacle CRJ accident. As I recall that had little to do with training. The pilot treated the a/c as if it was a different type, zooming to a FL it was not certified to.
Will