Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

[walter kennedy]

Cows getting bigger
<<OK, let's put this "business at the Mull" argument to bed shall we? I will agree that maybe the crew wanted to make an unplanned landing at your uber-secret LZ; like many other things, impossible to prove.>>
In reverse order:
“impossible to prove”: the RADALT warning and HP's baro altimeter settings were appropriate for an imminent landing at the elevation of that LZ;
they were lined up for it – 035 mag was the best line for it (you have to have been there!); the steer calculation data showed a track of 028 T, which was equivalent to 035 mag; and the HP's HoSI course setting was found on 035;
the power levels were matched and at a level which had resulted in a calculated reduction in air speed which suggests a stable situation for coasting in to something.
“ uber-secret LZ”: it was no secret to locals and squaddies that it had been well used up until this crash – by Chinooks, too – Flt Lt Tapper had landed there himself on a previous occasion – if this was the old Soviet Union, I could expect such denial, why so here?


<<Why on earth would the passengers have had any interest in a demonstration of such a capability? ... a demonstration of an allegedly secret SH capability that those particular people would have had absolutely no interest in is nonsense.>> I have given my thoughts on this before – briefly now, I would have thought that such a system would have been of great interest to certain of those officers on board (think of extracting their men in a hurry from an OP, just for one example) – the inclusion of such a minor diversion into the flight for such a demo would have been an easy sell to them


<<Secondly, why would the det unilaterally add such a landing to the task? All they would have wanted to do was get their passengers to destination and then go home (or stay over).>> This was described as a training flight by an RAF officer at one of the inquiries – after he realised his gaff, he back pedalled with a truism – he explained that there was a shortage of hours available for training and so wherever and whenever possible training could have been inserted into an otherwise routine flight. Anyone here want to dispute this?
<<The very thought of that simple bus run task encompassing another, 'black' procedure is just too off the wall.>> Putting your all into this piece of spin, were you?


<<PS. I genuinely don't have any knowledge of any FPL left behind. If I had filed one the route would have read DCT, nothing more.>> I ask again for someone who saw what was passed as a photocopy of the flight plan to come forward – surely someone in the Mull group could at least get access to it and comment as to its relevence if there is anything on it that prevents its complete disclosure?


Barbies Boy Friend
You raise some interesting points.
<<We lost an Islander there during the proc turn in good (night) VMC a few years ago>> If this was the air ambulance, it was well out to sea and not running into rock but spatial disorientation did the trick (from memory)? Descending through broken cloud (down to 400ft?) at night over the sea - it was not really “good VMC”, was it? And the (sole) pilot was doing an instrument approach, was he not? But I'm glad you mentioned this one as it was covered by Lowther Hill primary and secondary radar – as this Chinook should have been during the bulk of the sea crossing (SSR code! ).


<<Often, even though VMC prevailed, the Mull was cloudy. There is often orographic uplift and a cap on top. …. The clouds tended to form on the upwind side of the Mull.>>
Good stuff – I have tried to explain these weather conditions on this thread previously – especially in the case of a strong on-shore wind in the late afternoon when you can get a thin layer of mist riunning up the slope right on the ground blurring surface detail. Now please, as a pilot, explain to us all on this thread what it is like to approach such a headland in those conditions – can you not “see” the ground from a good way off? If you were attempting to land on the lower slopes of such a headland, such that you were indeed heading straight for it, just how hard would it be to judge your closing range visually? It would be hard to argue with an instrument that was telling you that you had further to go than you did if the thing was wrong, wouldn't it? Get the point?