bfisk, an interesting choice of words for a SOP. You may wish to ask your management for their explanation of ‘absolute’.
Again, a ‘play on words’, but very few things are ‘absolute’, thus in gusty conditions you cannot be sure that something remains which is operationally significant.
Yet again, what is significant? This implies a balance of risk, which requires knowledge of the risks in the operation. This is interesting because researches inform us that the misjudgment of risk is a significant contributor to error in landing accidents.
IMHO, the SOP invites opportunities for error, particularly where ill disciplined thought, or ‘subconscious’ human factors pressures might sway the decision; the "but may be" allows an errant way out.
Another reason for discontinuing an approach in gusts is related to skill and currency.
The certification regulations define limiting crosswind conditions as not requiring exceptional pilot skill, which is similar to most aspects of manual flight.
Manual landings are flown in a range of conditions and the basic skills checked regularly, but the skill in crosswind landing may not be practiced or checked at all.
I recall that flying a crosswind landing in a sufficiently strong wind was a required in the initial license flight test – it took me a month to wait for the wind. Thereafter I don’t recall any such test or check; I could have flown the reminder of my career without encountering a max crosswind.
Where pilots are not familiar with strong crosswind, what risk do they consider about their current ability (currency) to fly a demanding landing; as research shows, pilots overestimate their own ability to deal with a perceived risk and to fly the aircraft in difficult circumstances.
Ref:
Risk perception and risk management in aviation.
One of the defensive measures discussed in this article is to focus on why ‘should’ the activity be undertaken, and not how ‘could’ it be done. We have to explain the reasons for our decision, first to ourselves, and then to others.