AF447

[Hyperveloce]

The EASA stance

The EASA claims:
"The Aircraft Flight and/or Flight Crew Operating Manuals include procedures for unreliable airspeed indication (Air data system misleading information) and these should be well known by flight crews. Correct application of these procedures by flight crews may be crucial for assuring the safety of the aircraft when such Pitot-static malfunctions occur."
sure, but
1) the Air Caraïbe crew got out without problem by not applying entirely (the stall alarm part) these crucial procedures (and some of its parts being not implementable due to time constraints)
2) how can a crew rely on any procedure when the safety of the plane is immediately impacted by a (false) stall alarm and that the pilot has to take an immediate decision in a context of unreliable airspeeds ? (the AF Paris Antananarivo case)
3) the word "crucial" sounds weird when a month ago Pitot problems posed no safety problems.
I don't understand why the high probability of false stall alarms in this context is never mentioned by the authorities (always mentioning the airspeed loss & pich/thrust procedures).
now, the EASA says it is considering a mandatory change of at least two of the three Pitot probes, so as to have at least two Goodrich probes:
http://www.lexpress.fr/actualites/2/l-ue-voudrait-interdire-un-type-de-capteur-sur-l-airbus-a330_777849.html
I don't even understand why one suspect probe is tolerated on board Oh yes, the suspect probe only failed 6 sec. between Paris and Rome a couple of weeks ago. But...How long since they had been introduced ? There should not be any compromise to the safety (all the more if it is about 2000$ per plane).
Jeff, pissed off, and intrigued
PS) Has the NTSB produced any report on the Northwest case of Pitot freezing ?