Originally Posted by
HazelNuts39
RE: Hyperveloce (#3969 p.199)
The general principle is that there must be an acceptable relation between the calculated probability that a certain failure occurs and the effect of that failure on the safe continuation of flight.
I see. But we have:
1) an intrument or a device (can be a Pitot-Static system, a plane)
2) a signal/indicator monitoring the performance of 1)
3) relevant procedures when 2) is activated
4) crew training/reactions to 2), given 3) and their observation of 1)
and it seems that all the 4 contribute to the flight safety ? If the regulations only specify the first 2, are they sufficient to ensure a probability on the safe continuation of flight ? (How is the "acceptable relation" between 1)-2) & 3)-4) & the overall flight safety impact defined or evaluated ?). Are there specifications about false alarms rates in normal/degraded modes ?
Jeff