The Half-Full, Half-Empty A400M Glass
Comment by Dr. Ezio Bonsignore, Editor-in-Chief of MILITARY TECHNOLOGY (MILTECH) 09:16 GMT, July 27, 2009
With so many exceedingly important factors, interests and considerations being involved in the A400M saga, and with quite a few of them being in contradiction with each other, it was arguably unavoidable that even the most prudent and logical decision being taken in trying to identify a way forward for the programme would leave a bittersweet taste in one’s mouth.
The member countries have now decided on a further “grace period” until the end of the year, which comes on top of the previous three-month extension granted in April. This implies that at least for the time being, the member countries do not intend to cancel the programme, nor do they want to punish EADS by imposing the financial penalties they are entitled to. Rather, the months ahead will be used to try and define a new overall structure for the programme that would necessarily require a complete renegotiation of technical goals, time schedules and costs.
In itself, the decision to carry on with the A400M makes eminent sense. The European Air Forces do need a new transport aircraft for both tactical and strategic roles, and there is plenty of political and industrial reasons to argue for this to be a European-designed and –manufactured plane. No matter the very strong reservations one might have about the appalling mixture of incompetence and arrogance EADS displayed in handling the project, it remains that at this point in time for the member countries to completely cancel the programme would come dangerously close to cut off one’s nose to spite one’s face. The money that could be extracted from EADS as penalties and compensations, and the malignant satisfaction of “teaching ‘em a lesson”, would be a very meagre counterbalance to the unmitigated disaster of a cancellation.
Yet, one cannot avoid being disturbed by certain aspects and implications of the decision as announced in Le Castelet.
First of all, there is nothing in the wording of the communiqué to sternly indicate the end of the year as the absolute final deadline for the programme to be brought back on track. Unfortunately, past experience is only too clear a pointer to the dangers of leaving industry in the comfortable perception that as a monopolistic supplier, they are virtually guaranteed against any conceivable harsh move. What is supposed to happen, should 31 December 2009 fail to bring about real and tangible results? Another farcical six-month extension, perhaps? And so on and so on?
Even more significantly and indeed alarmingly, there is nothing in either the official communiqué or the accompanying commentaries to suggest that the lessons of the past mistakes have been duly understood, and steps will be implemented to avoid repeating them.
The programme will be renegotiated, which in clear terms will unavoidably mean giving EADS more time and more money to design and produce an aircraft, substantially below the original performance and specifications. And so be it. But there is not the slightest hint at the programme being also revised as regards its management and overall structure. EADS has finally been able to correct some long-standing weaknesses in the organisation of Airbus Military (to be honest to them, these weaknesses were not EADS’ own fault and rather stemmed from political interference), but it is still too early to assess whether this move will really have a positive impact on the A400M programme. And on the other side of the fence, the governments quite clearly have not the slightest intention to give OCCAR, which is formally in charge of managing the programme on their behalf, the level of authority and responsibility it would need.
This is not a good omen.