THe MOD has always been open to new information about the crash of ZD576 specifically but going on about airworthiness, incidents in other aircraft etc without being able to link it directly to ZD576 on the day of the accident is a complete waste of time.
The usual crass MoD stuff and nonsense. Only non-aircrew, non-engineer and someone wholly unfamiliar with airworthiness could make the statement that, if it can’t be directly linked to ZD576, then it is irrelevant.
The policy concerning trend failures and how they are managed has been deemed not applicable to the Mull accident, driving a bus through whole tracts of the airworthiness regulations.
Think of it. A number of aircraft in your particular fleet exhibit the same problems, each time being deemed flight safety critical. As a pilot you’d be apoplectic if the support staffs treated every case as “isolated”, failing to recognise a trend. It would be incompetence on a grand scale.
But what if the resources required to implement such a process had been systematically withdrawn over the previous 3 years, by senior RAF staffs? Where does the incompetence lie?
And, to answer a point made by Purdey/MoD earlier, what offence has been committed if those staffs were advised their actions would compromise airworthiness yet knowingly continued? Take your pick from Misconduct, Maladministration, Breach of Duty of Care amounting to Gross Negligence. And, if deaths result, Manslaughter by Gross Negligence.
Compound this with the fact that the organisation charged with preparing the CA Release recommendations had grounded their trials aircraft, and in their report made it clear the aircraft is still in development and not fit for service (8 months after it has been prematurely released).
AC, I’m afraid your admission that you breached the Civil Service Code says it all.