Jeff,
Never say never! You're right that there's no mention of relevant sim training (at all, in the whole doc.) and therefore one way of reading the report is that the crew were, to say the least, surprised at both the actual events in the cockpit, and the contradiction in the checklists: ie, sim training had never produced this particular sequence and alerted folks to the puzzle. On the other hand, earlier in the report (and alluded to in the last bit of the extract) is that the crew pretty much instantly knew that the STALL warning was wrong - which might suggest that the circumstance had been encountered in some form previously... Difficult to guess.
But I'm in danger of expressing views beyong my knowledge here (I'm no pilot.....). I do think that the Air Caraibe report makes for very interesting reading though, for something that came rapidly close to getting away from the flight crew (ie, if they had not rejected the STALL warnings...).
AGB