Aguadalte :
Apart from the fact that there are reports of allegedly unreliable speed indication problems with all sorts of equipment, there is no relationship between AF447 and QF72.
I agree
Coming back to basics of the investigation, its easy for me, to understand why they didn't deviate from the storm.
Whether they did or not is a red herring.
The position at 0210Z, reported on either the MeteoFrance map or Tim's 0215Z sat infrared picture puts the airplane out of the convection area. (something that most posters still haven't accepted, I wonder why ? ).
The on-board fuel weight corresponded to forecast trip fuel of 63,900 kg, route factor fuel of 1460 kg, final reserve of 2200 kg, fuel to alternate airport reserve of 1900 kg and 940 kg additional fuel
This is the flight plan that the Captain signed :
- Trip fuel ...63940
- Alternate fuel ORY 1900
- Contingency 1460
- Final reserve 2200
- Extra fuel 900 (at captain's decision)
What additional fuel, for ETOPS / loss of pressurisation, ETPs is included in the route/flight study and is inside the fuel load. Please note that on this particular flight, the en-route alternates were Natal and Sal, which are on the planned flight track.
It intrigues me that the value of contingency fuel of AF447 is only 1460 kg.
It's because AF fuel policy takes into account the burn-off caused by the need to carry a given load. The fuel plan shows the quantities left at the end of the flight : Basically, the alternate / contingency / final reserve /...are carried to the landing at destination, hence they are part of the landing weight and the burn-off they cause is included in the trip fuel.
In this case, and considering that the K factor on this flight was 1.350, a contingency fuel of 1460 kg at destination is worth 1460 x 1.350 = 1970 kg which is in fact slightly more than the required 3% of the trip fuel (1918 kg ).
I'm not saying that, because they were limited on fuel, they could not deviate, but I'm willing to accept the fact they didn't.
You are not saying it....true....Just strongly suggesting...
I'm almost the only one here writing about human factors.
And what is the basis for your discussion ?
- All aspects of the flight prior to 0210Z show a functioning aircrew, doing a serious job of keeping ahead of the aircraft, proposing some strict R/T procedures...
- A crew who was kept abreast of any changes on the route weather (the despatch message confirming some active convection inside the ITCZ)
Against that, a lot of hot air about "other aircraft have deviated...bla..bla bla ..." and not one of these posters has taken the effort of plotting those deviations on the sat pictures. Most of these flights were still smack inside the red area, except maybe the IB flight on their 70 Nm east of track who would have flown between the two most active zones.
I find it quite arrogant to judge on a crew's action without a modicum 1/-of experience of flying through the ITCZ and 2/-in the comfort of an armchair.
These guys had one hour and six minutes of flight worth in fuel and you tell me that they were concerned about any deviation or diversion ?
As to what happened after 0210Z, we are into speculations and conjectures.
And if we start the game about how this crew reacted to a wholly abnormal situation, we need both to consider what happened as the ACARS messages don't tell the whole story, and who was in the flight deck at that moment, taking into account AF policy of "
no left-hand seat qual for F/Os".
But that's the sort of speculation I would be very careful in discussing.