aquadalte;
What I don't understand is why, after almost 3700 replies on this second thread, I'm almost the only one here writing about human factors
Well, if I can offer this view as a pilot (now retired), I think many colleagues here are only too keenly aware of the human factors possibilities but have remained essentially silent because, like the accident itself there is only so much one can say and it's all from the ACARS messages and what little the BEA adds to the thinking. At this point there is absolutely nothing to speculate meaningfully upon regarding human factors. We can delve tentatively into a few possibilities that you have touched upon but I'm not sure the discussion has anywhere to go at the moment.
You mention fuel load - most pilots who have contributed to this thread have faced the issue of offloading freight for more fuel or risking an enroute landing/diversion due to weather etc - those flight planning problems are all in a day's work. Whether the two guys up front didn't want to risk a weather diversion because they only had 900+kg of fuel and weren't aware how little it takes to go a hundred nm's off course and back, or whether they knew how to read and interpret their radar returns are all human factors and are all moot points for the time being.
Analyzing "human factors" at this point risks building a series of straw man arguments and then knocking them down - the arguments and their possibilities, mean nothing in the sense that they explain the accident in a way that other ways have not.
Yes, the crew could have run across an extremely rare triple failure - pitot sensors, ADIRU 1 or 2, and a PRIM1, these equipment failures being all independant of one another for the theory to work, the failure of the PRIM with subsequent ND bias requiring action under the AD, (assuming they knew that action off by heart, which I am almost 100% certain both would not know), - there is NO way they would have had time to look it up and run the checklist from the QRH OEB section.
And if they launched into shutting an ADR and/or IRU off "by memory", unless they were following an ECAM drill that got interrupted by a serious event, that takes us into extremely rare and difficult territory -in the realm of rogue actions outside memory and checklist territory in a last-ditch panic, again another human factors matter but in my view given the airline involved and the circumstances the flight was in, not very probable if not all but impossible. Also, we still dont' know what manufacturer's ADIRUs were installed.