I just wonder what in this case is convincing you to believe that an A330-200, fitted with HONEYWELL ADIRUs, and showing problems with unreliable airspeed probes freezing, would be comparable with an A330-300, fitted with NORTHROP GRUMMAN-LITTON ADIRUs, and showing AOAs spikes unfiltered?
What in AF447 ACARS sequence is similar to QF72 case?
- answer: nothing.
So, maybe its time to drop this claim for lack of any substantial or relevant fact to come with.
Takata,
Apart from the fact that there are reports of allegedly unreliable speed indication problems with all sorts of equipment, there is no relationship between AF447 and QF72.
But regarding the speculation about what really happened to AF447, your and everyone's speculative ideas, have the same value of mine...
And having in consideration the statistics regarding causes for air accidents, I think human error is well ahead of equipment failure.
I'm convinced that the Air France pilots are just men, not Gods, and that they may have committed a mistake by disconnecting the wrong equipment while dealing with a dramatic situation.
Coming back to basics of the investigation, its easy for me, to understand why they didn't deviate from the storm. They have taken-off from SBGL limited by MTOW. The Captain could not have ordered any extra fuel without prejudice of payload due to the ETOW of 233,757Kg.
According to BEA prelim report page 17, fuel weight was 70,400Kg.
In the next page of the report:
The on-board fuel weight corresponded to forecast trip fuel of 63,900 kg, route factor fuel of 1460 kg, final reserve of 2200 kg, fuel to alternate airport reserve of 1900 kg and 940 kg additional fuel
.
According to EU OPS 1:
(12) OPS 1.255 Fuel Policy:
(i) For A to A Flights — An operator shall specify the minimum fuel contents at which a flight must end. This
minimum, final reserve, fuel must not be less than the amount needed to fly for a period of 45 minutes.
(ii) For A to B Flights — An operator shall ensure that the pre-flight calculation of usable fuel required for a flight
includes;
(A) Taxi fuel — Fuel consumed before take-off, if significant; and
(B) Trip fuel (Fuel to reach the destination); and
(C) Reserve fuel –
(1) Contingency fuel —
Fuel that is not less than 5 % of the planned trip fuel or, in the event of in-flight replanning, 5 % of the trip fuel for the remainder of the flight; and
(2) Final reserve fuel —
Fuel to fly for an additional period of 45 minutes (piston engines) or 30 minutes (turbine engines);
and
(D) Alternate fuel —
Fuel to reach the destination alternate via the destination, if a destination alternate is required; and
(E) Extra fuel —
Fuel that the commander may require in addition to that required under subparagraphs (A)-(D) above.
The term Additional Fuel is used in EU OPS 1, when needed due to ETOPS especial fuel needs:
Additional fuel, if required by the type of operation (e.g. ETOPS);
I believe the term used by BEA,
route factor fuel, meant
contingency fuel, (a value of 5 % of the trip fuel (that may also be reduced to 3%, when a fuel alternate aerodrome is available under certain circumstances). It intrigues me that the value of contingency fuel of AF447 is only 1460 kg. Additional fuel is supposed to cope for ETOPS minimum fuel needs at ETPs and is added to Estimated Total Fuel that must already contemplate all the items of Part 1.255 of EU OPS 1.
I'm not saying that, because they were limited on fuel, they could not deviate, but I'm willing to accept the fact they didn't. What I don't understand is why, after almost 3700 replies on this second thread, I'm almost the only one here writing about human factors.