To be fair I think the TSB is focusing on the right things, according to the items being reviewed/investigated (from the last TSB report) :
The reason the recorder stopped remains under investigation.
Further examination is being carried out by the TSB Engineering Laboratory to determine the cause and sequence of this loss of tail rotor drive.
A detailed metallurgical examination of the studs, nuts, and filter bowl is under way to identify the origin of the fatigue cracks and to determine the fracture mechanism.
The reason the collars failed to inflate is still under investigation.
In addition, pilot training, human performance aspects, crew resource management, and cockpit ergonomics will be evaluated.
As a result of the fracture of the filter bowl mounting studs, resulting in the loss of a large quantity of oil, the certification guidance material is being reviewed.
Additionally, the FAA and Sikorsky Aircraft are working to identify all the modes of failure that might lead to Sikorsky S-92A MGB oil loss, determining their probability of occurrence, and developing appropriate mitigation strategies.
A number of issues regarding survivability such as passenger immersion suit and crew flight suit effectiveness, use of underwater breathing devices, adequacy of survival training, adequacy of general ditching procedures, personal locator beacons, weather/sea state flight limitations, and Sikorsky S-92A flotation system are currently under investigation.
TSB will no doubt, when considering the human factors side, look at the background as to what could influence why certain decisions were or weren't made at the time and will have access to information from many levels that has not yet been the subject of public debate.
Still wondering if the risk assessment after the Broome incident will come under further scrutiny ?