Sorry folks, I'm still not clear on what approach was flown, other than it was a non precision. I can't find an NDB approach for HAH as such, but they appear to have an approach menu of either a Visual, VOR-DME or an ILS.
Most likely the VOR 02 circling to land 20? Anyone?
If it was an NDB 02 circling, then I'd think that a poor choice, unless the VOR was NOTAMed off the air.
RNP 0.3 is MORE than adequate for a NPA. Back when we didn't have RNP, an NDB approach was fairly accurately flown using the bird in the cage. (with timely and reasonably accurate mode selections)
I'm running with the notion it was an approach to 20 off a circling, based on the METAR.
FMCH 292200Z 18022G33KT 9999 FEW020 24/17 Q1018 NOSIG=
FMCH 292300Z 21025G35KT 9999 FEW020 25/16 Q1017 TEMPO 18015G30KT=
For the A310 pilots reading this thread.
Unless I'm missing the obvious, how is weather a problem here?
Circling for Rwy 20 the wind is practically on the nose. So, how is wind a problem? Turbulent? Most likely. Windshear? Probably.
My suspicion is horizontal shear rather than vertical shear due to the rocks. Potentially, a bit of both. FDR readings will give us a better idea. But, dare I ask, if windshear was present (regardless of type or direction) on finals, and the crew had difficulty with it, wouldn't the cropper be on final instead of in the water? So, if it was W/S go, the disorientation over water at night while hand flying sounds reasonable. Methinks a 'properly trained' crew would be "Positive rate", "Gear up, Auto Pilot Engage" Heading right over the water to fly the 02 miss to 6000'.
As I recall, on page 1 of the A310 FCOM, Airbus tell you the aircraft was designed for maximum use of the automatics. Autopilots are unlikely to suffer spatial disorientation if you provide the APFD with proper modes. As a previous poster pointed out, we humans get spatial disorientation most likely when hand flying over water, in a turn, at night.
I'm inclinded to suggest two basic sins might have been committed here. A lack of threat and error management along with an inadequate use of the automatics. Of course, we won't know for awhile if these are factors in this accident because I'm only speculating. (I love to speculate)
I am not assuming this crew was 'inadequately' trained or not 'trained to proficiency'. I assume they were. It may however, have been awhile since they found themselves in a similar situation. Some of us battle with that balance between optimum use of the automatics and our manual proficiency. Sometimes the untimely choice between the two issues, in the wrong situation or circumstance, can be disasterous. This just might turn out to be one of those times?
Last edited by Willie Everlearn; 11th Jul 2009 at 16:11.