JuggleDan;
Actually, even the bean counters may actually learn a few good things
. . .
I daresay there is hope yet!
I doubt it. Fought too many fights, seen enough studied ignoring of "inconvenient" data to believe any of that.
That's not to say they're not good - they are, and I know of dozens and dozens of ways that flight safety is protected, enhanced and otherwise "looked after". Otherwise the stats would be horrendous.
I don't focus on "beancounter parsimony". I focus on the propensity of very good, motivated people with earnest intentions and very high standards to normalize "normalizing the deviance". Airlines have extremely good safety records including the one I retired from - there are exceptionally good procedures in place to secure safe flight. That is not where the issues lie. The issues lie in being "satisficed" - proceeding with an air of satisfaction to the point where there may be a latent unwillingness to examine uncomfortable and even plainly inconvenient operational data. Seen it - been scared at the lack of curiosity or interest. Organizational issues are curious this way, and I will bet that
Will Fraser was turning his attention to this much broader matter in the later posts given some of his comments on the "mileu" in which reports are written.
The story of an accident is not one of bad people doing poor work, or ordinary people succumbing to what Diane Vaughan termed, "amoral calculation" as in "what can we get away with?" That rarely happens in aviation, certainly not without result.
It is the story of earnest people trying to satisfy dozens of competing interests and priorities which, almost 100% of the time, are sorted benignly. The seeds of accidents are sown months, but more often years, before the occurence, in attitudes, in actions not taken and data not hearkened to.
These are not mysterious forces or anomalous contingencies. They are standard fare for any safety specialist, who will always wear a different pair of glasses than the operations managers and beancounters. The key is in the balance and that balance is set by a very active and robust two-way communication between those that must make money and those that ensure a safe operation. Over the decades I have become convinced that that conversation does not always take place.
PJ2