Just read it. frustrating. no forensic data available to the BEA at the date of the report ? just visual inspection made on 30 bodies on board the Ventose frigate. In the absence of the recorded data of the flight, forensic data and associated identities when available seems of prime importance. Analysis on the debris would indicate that the structural integrity of the aircraft was not compromised before it impacted the sea surface with a high vertical speed (a high rate vertical *acceleration* is mentionned in the report). The VS would have been detached with a forward motion by the impact, but the damages on the lower part of the rudder does not seem adressed: did the aircraft impact the surface tail first, then belly ? It is said that the connecting brackets between the floor and the walls were bent backwards: is it the result of the impact with a high vertical speed and tail first/a positive pich ? does it suggest that the aircraft had also a significant horizontal speed ?
No analysis of the distribution of the debris versus their drift/date of recoverage. If the aircraft impacted the surface in one piece, the debris/bodies were initially collocated: between the debris collected on June 6 and those collected on June 9, there is a differential drift between groups of debris/bodies (approx. 15 NM on 6 days for the ones, approx 60 NM on 9 days for the others) which is very difficult to account with the NOAA data derived from satellite observations. Furthermore, if the AF 447 had been flying at mach 0.82 from the last ACARS position at 22:10Z, to 22:14:30Z the aircraft would be too much north on its way to TASIL to explain the position of the first debris collected on June 6 (it would require a drift toward the west).
About the ACARS temporary interruption at 22:13Z, a minute before the definitive interruption: no explanation offered (severe met conditions degradating the satcom link budget ? unusual aircraft attitude and possible fuselage masking ?).
It is a report a bit frustrating because about established facts only, giving the feeling that sometimes it would require a bit of interpretation or explanation (of the established facts) or even expert assumptions/opinions about possible causes. I have learnt more by reading the contributions of the good, experiented flying people here on PPruNe than by reading this report, despite less data available to them.And the main question remains unanswered: how did the pilots come to lose the control of an Airbus which is said to be fully controlable even in alternate law 2 and pich & thrust, moderate turbulences, and procedures (unreliable speed) to implement.
How the crew reacted to the cascade of fault reports, alarms and applied the procedures is surely part of the key. Stall or overspeed warnings are not recorded by the ACARS but if the crew were subjected to stall alarms whil flying in ALTN 2/pich & thrust, and instructed by the procedures to take them in account: how should they have reacted to these stall alerts ? (the Air Caraibe captain chose to ignore them despite th instructions). Would they alter the pich & thrust parameters on their own (decrease pich and/or augment thrust) to gain speed ?
Sorry for this long contribution.
Jeff