IcarusRising, post 2889; http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/3...ml#post5038394;
It is not uncommon for me to return from rest to find laptops out on the pull tray obscuring flight instruments or sorry animated discussions about work and pay conditions while the aircraft does her own thing an receiving looks of disbelief when voice my concern that monitoring aircraft flight performance and weather conditions mean just that and not getting sucked into complacency and side distractions. I am looked on by some crews as a relic and behind the times !
Yep. I
occasionally found the same scene upon return and had the same "relic" feeling. With reduced standards in terms of experience and training, I suspect we'll see much more of the behaviour you are describing, (casual monitoring, laptops out, discussing everything under the sun, etc)
ralphie;
I am sorry to hear that you are retired. I would love to hear that Airbus or Boeing or whoever would grab you as a fantastic teaching authority. That is the same for all other retired captains on this forum. The airline industry should be using you big time!!!
There are a lot of pilots contributing here and who are in the industry with the same and far higher qualifications than I who are retired or retiring and who, because airlines don't pay well enough to attract the kinds of mentors the business needs, are for the most part lost to those coming along. I had a contract for specialized flight safety work for a year and was deemed "too expensive" so that ended that.
We shouldn't leave the impression that the new pilots are a different breed - they're not. They're as keen and as safe as they can possibly be. The key is, they have to have experience in aviation, not in schools which give out airline pilot licenses after 250hrs of simulator and a bit of line training. That's where the problem is. Most guys in my group had thousands of hours before being hired. We sat in the Second Officer's seat for a while if we were lower time, and we learned from the guys up front - the good and the bad. There are schools that can give an MCPL but there aren't mentoring programs, and mentoring only shares attitudes and stories; one must "do", to gain experience and quite frankly because of the way airlines have treated pilots as "expensive resources which need to be beaten down", fewer and fewer young people are choosing the career.
From Eurocockpit "RC analysis, posted by
Squawk_ident, post 2897
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/3...ml#post5038676;
-> The descent of the aircraft involves a descent of the altitude of the cabin ordered by the main controller of pressurization (the other being functionally on standby). It is what occurs with each descent so that at the opening of the door, on the ground, the outside pressure is the same than the one inside the cabin. There is thus a regulation of the descent of the cabin altitude as the plane goes down. If the plane would start a very fast descent, the controller of pressurization would try to reduce very quickly the altitude of the cabin. This variation is by design limited to 750 ft/mn, which cannot thus generate an alarm corresponding to a value algebraically higher than 1800 ft/mn. If the plane was not in descent but unfortunately in a fall, it would then join the altitude of the cabin before the controller of pressurization could sufficiently reduce the cabin. In this case, the pressurization would be reversed: the pressure outside the plane would become higher than that of the cabin. To avoid the implosion, “safety valves” and “negative relief valve” open in the event of negative differential pressure (0,25 psi). In this case, the rate of variation of the cabin follows the fall of the plane to minimize the difference in pressure and the rate can thus be much higher than 1800 ft/mn.
This scenario assumes that the engines are running all the way to impact. I doubt very much whether they were and explain why in post #2921,
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/3...ml#post5038998
Xeque, post 2902 http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/3...ml#post5038792;
We have an object that appears to have fallen from the sky with normal, gravitational terminal velocity. We have no contact from anyone or anything inside it. There was no attempt (it appears) to prepare for a crash landing in the ocean.
The only explanation that makes sense to me is that they were all incapacitated at the moment of catastrophe whilst still in the cruise.
Now, what to infer from that? I have absolutely no idea and I would suspect that no-one else has either.
Contact would likely not be possible. The chaos in the cockpit due to warnings and probable turbulence would occupy the crew for the first minute or two; dealing with a rapidly developing emergency and prioritizing actions, handling a degrading aircraft uncertain of airspeed and probably dealing with the significant shock of what was happening would not permit communications. As dozens of professionals here have pointed out, we "aviate, navigate and communicate" even in such rapidly unfolding circumstances.
As described in the post above, with the possible/probable loss of electrical power after the stall had fully developed, only VHF1 would be available. VHF 1 is usually set to 121.5 when a flight is handed over to air-radio (who in turn, communicate with the ATC unit doing the actual controlling) and, with no CPDLC (google "FANS"), all communications are done via HF communications. There is no way in the circumstances this crew was in, that they would be broadcasting in the blind on HF - they could have broadcast on 121.5 which other aircraft would have heard, but didn't. We can only surmise why but I highly doubt that they or anyone in the cabin were incapacitated due to pressurization issues. Determining if the masks deployed might possibly be done through an examination of the pins holding the doors closed in the overhead panel where the masks are stored - that would indicate that the cabin reached at least, roughly, just over 14,000ft but the BEA said nothing about this. There are such panels in the wreckage.
Will Fraser;
The trail still needs unwinding to the moment of loss of control.
We have at least some clues, but no evidence.
vovachan;
I too was somewhat surprised that other ac were deviating quite considerably to avoid the weather while AF447 seems to have flown in a straight line until the last known position. They never requested a deviation. What is the protocol in that area where comms are flaky if you lose contact with ATC - do you deviate anyway and hope for the best? Stay the course damn the CBs?
Frankly, while none of us was there, I was astonished when I saw the satellite maps of the area, that some course deviation did not take place, and that impression has been subsequently supported by the actions of other flights in the area. Conditions don't change that much in half an hour. I don't think it is wise or fair to begin building a picture of the decision-making process but it is one factor among many that requires examination in my view; - 'nuff said for now.
As far as deviating around thunderstorms in areas of "flaky" communications, you do what you have to do - deviate as necessary to ensure the safety of the flight. You light the aircraft up with all landing lights etc, broadcast intentions on the common frequency, perhaps climb 300 to 500ft if you're really uncertain about traffic and continue to broadcast while deviating. CPDLC is such an improvement in flight safety that it should be mandated by ICAO for all countries which serve communications for international flights.
PJ2