UNCTUOUS:
Static isn’t just the hash detected by the ears. Obstructed/iced static lines may prove to be the glue that ties in all the AF447 esoteric failure indications. Read Takata’s entire FCTM citation and you get the impression that the safety factor afforded by triple redundancy is more precisely a fallible fallacy foisted upon a gullible coterie of aviating automatons.
Hi,
I agree with the general point saying that the static pressure was at some point contamined as the TCAS and Cabin controller reacted also, altitude being also unreliable, but we don't know the error magnitude for sure. It could be a function of dynamic pressure correcting static pressure.
As for the pernicious contamination from the ground, I do not share your point because:
1. the system reacted and disconnected the flight envelope protections, showing that it was an abrupt change of air data stream at 0210.
2. the flightpath doesn't show any acceleration of F-GZCP during her whole flight.
3. GPS altitude could be used to control Indicated altitude at any time.
4. Your premice being "loss of control between 0210-0214" is based on nothing acertained until now; this is by far not the only possibility behind this catastrophe. We'll certainly learn more in a few minutes about it.
Then, your
"fallible fallacy foisted upon a gullible coterie of aviating automatons" is falling short of your main point. A triple redundant air data system linked to automation or a triple redundant system linked to no automation would not change the problem of icing all the probes beyond specification or beyond design limit (here is pointed the Thales 'AA' probe as underperforming due to drainage system). Beside, triple analogic instrumentation showing three different unreliable value-sets won't help the pilot very much for the same reasons.
S~
Olivier