Originally Posted by PJ2
If the standby instruments fail, (which there is question of in the 447 ISIS case), there is no other system, archaic or no, and the mechanical standbys in the 320, 330 and 340 were tiny, poorly lit and would be impossible to read in heavy turbulence. These instruments are certainly not going to help you inside a thunderstorm.
What I am pleading is the case for examining in detail the recorded issues to see the pattern or common thread if there is one, from which, I think you'd agree, the problem can be defined and if chronic, fixed, and if intermittent and statistically granular, addressed strategically. In part this has already been accomplished with the Unreliable Airspeed memory items and QRH checklist.
I think you need to understand that no bread-and-butter "archane" system presenting basic attitudes/speeds etc is going to right an aircraft or permit the crew to manually do same, that is badly upset.
What such a system must do, (and in my view it requires good flight conditions to do it for the reasons stated, "good" being in cloud, at night, no moon, no visible horizon, possible icing and moderate turbulence) is provide a horizon and a direct speed indication until the crew can stabilize the aircraft.
I can assure you that no instrumentation no matter how robust and no autoflight system will permit safe flight inside, or even offer a good chance of surviving penetration of, a large, developing thunderstorm at high altitude by a transport category aircraft. No pilot, no designer, no certification body and no regulator has a right to expect that any airliner should perform otherwise. If one enters a thunderstorm, one is, for all intents and purposes, in test-pilot territory with an unknown outcome.
Well said sir, and thank you for all your other posts as well. They have been informative, measured, well articulated and reflect your professionallism and experience. Kudos captain!
I'm an old retired dog and have never flown a FBW airliner, but I have flown many others, for many years, all over the world. Before this accident I knew little about Airbus products or airliner FBW systems. Now I've read ever single post in several forums and done a lot of independent research reading manuals and official accident/incident reports. I don't know enough to fly one of those things, but I do know enough to observe that I do not regret that I never did.
What you say above about thunderstorms is accurate and well said. What you say about these systems is far too conservative and generous, for me. I appreciate why you take that stance and respect your consevatism and restraint. I am less conservative.
When we have multiple incidents of 3, 5 or all 6 screens going blank due to the failure of a single Bus, not once but several times. When we have a series of upsets or partial upsets from which pilots were lucky enough to recover, sometimes with injury to passengers; when we have the mysterious disappearance of an airliner with a seasoned crew (AF447) and a plethora of automated messages indicating multiple failures and warnings; when we have standy attitude instruments that can share in these malfunctions and that have independent power for no more than 5 minutes, and are difficult if not impossible to read in heavy turbulence; when we have, repeatedly, apparent multiple sensor failures producing erroneous data that disables funcionality at least in part; when we have at least a dozen senior captains in type all debating about how these systems truly function - and not agreeing after a month - I would call these experiences/events more than chronic. There's something very wrong about all this and it is dangerous.
Lengthy and cryptic checklists buried in the QRH, and multiple warnings with ECAMS scrolling so fast as to be illegible, and multiple memory items for problems that pilots do not appear (from what I read here, elsewhere and in the official reports) to understad in depth are not a solution for an obvious problem, nor are they a "reason" for its repeated occurrence - they are an excuse. The excuses are too many and too inadequate. They must be replaced by
solutions that avoid repetition, not more excuses or modified check lists.
All airplanes have their problems it is true, but these particular designs seem, to me, to have more than their share. The manufacturer has not so far - in my opinion - resolved the problem whatever it is. They need to do so and fast! I don't know enough to suggest a remedy, but I do know that one must be found.
We do not know what happened to AF447 and unless the FDR and CVR are recovered and readable, most probably we will never know. The crew may well have made an error by inadvertently flying into the mother of all cells. I don't know and I am not prepared to guess or to assume without evidence. Even if that is so, there is no doubt in my mind that the systems of this design were less than helpful in what ever situation/scenario presented itself to that crew. That is unacceptable to me.
Some airliners of the type that I have flown have come apart in extreme turbulence. Yes, their pilots made errors but their systems did not induce those errors and did nor create or contribute to them. Most have survived ecounters with severe turbulence and their pilots were never confused with spurious warnings and unreliable instruments and systems producing incomprehensible warnings or uncommanded nose-overs.
Pilot error is something we all have to acknowledge. But, design induced pilot error is just plain unacceptable. This manufacturer needs to take a very hard look at its products. I'm not at all against technology, but experimentation with 'what ifs' should not be a part of airliner designs or operationl- no matter who produces them.
My apologies to all of you; I've already said too much.