Mad(Flt)Scientist;
The aircraft isn't going to be "grounded".
Of course it isn't.
lomapaseo;
I say again, don't get too wrapped up in simplified theories about pitot tubes.
Exactly.
Professorah;
The DC 10 was a totally different problem and should not be compared in anyway.
Mostly agree. It may be instructive to compare nevertheless. Where there are similarities they are political, not technical.
Oddly, the DC10 was grounded not after the Paris cargo door accident, the third time that failure of the cargo door had caused the collapse of the cabin floor indicating a serious and fundamental design flaw (which had been communicated after the first failure), but after the Chicago accident in which no design fault was found concerning the pylon structure. In other words, the grounding was political, not technical or directed towards flight safety.
There were design flaws in the cargo door which became evident during testing before the aircraft went into service. The forward cargo door on fuselage #1 blew open and a larg section of cabin floor collapsed. the problems were recognized but rather than re-design the door to a much safer plug-type installation, (such as the L1011), minor fixes were made but proved ineffective.
After the Windsor accident in which a cargo door blew open (about a month after the airplane entered service), and the floor collapsed, the FAA made a "Gentleman's Agreement" to fix the cargo door to avoid the embarrassing impact on sales that an AD would have. They issued a regular Service Bulletin instead, failing to avoid the Paris accident.
A year after the Paris accident the FAA issued an AD concerning the ability of cabin floors to withstand the differential pressure caused when one side of the pressure vessel lost pressure. This was accomplished through a combination of strengthened cabin floor structure and pressure relief (vent) valves.
The Chicago accident had nothing to do with the cargo door and the pylon design did not have problems in and of itself but was criticized for being vulnerable to maintenance damage, (fracture due to tight clearances) if improper maintenance procedures were used during engine/pylon changes. American Airlines and Continental Airlines had used non-standard methods for complying with Service Bulletins for the replacement of the rear spherical bearing engine mount.
The A330 pitot system per se does not have design flaws of anywhere near the same order as the design problems of the DC10. The pitot system does not have design flaws at all, in the sense that clear and present risk or vulnerability is demonstrated.
Someone mentioned 32 events but did not list them or describe them. They should be part of the present investigation and reviewed to see if there are larger issues at work or if this is component related.
Even with components examined, as lomapaseo correctly states, this is not a "pitot system" accident.
This accident is extremely complex and would be even if we had the boxes. Systems and components fail and aircrews are trained to respond to such failures.
Whether there are larger questions about design complexity and crews' ability to successfully respond and contain cascading system faults is not a matter over which an aircraft would (or should) be grounded but a matter which must be sorted out both within EASA and Airbus as well as other stakeholders such as airlines and aircrew representatives, especially those whose specialties are flight safety.