PJ2,
lomapaseo;
Quote:
Somewhere the FCOM etc. needs to be standardized in this respect so at least we know after the fact what side of the judgement curve (man or machine) needs to be looked at.
Failing the original opportunity to fulfill this philosophical need, ostensibly because the power and promise of "automation" was intoxicating to so many, what is now to be a re-examination has been a long time coming.
If there is one aspect of modern aviation this accident has shown is the hidden level of integration and automation now present in our airplanes.
As a pilot, I can understand the implications of one failure or a set of faults, their resulting performance degradation, the various reversions...
But when it comes to really knowing where the monitoring is, where the decisions to accept or eliminate a given component come from...good luck !
Here, for instance - and I understand how frustrating it is - The ADR DISAGREE condition is the last stage of elimination of one or more possibly faulty ADRs, meaning that in any case, we will end up with a dual ADR failure condition - or more. The fact is that when the A/P was lost, the AFCS had already determined that it couldn't work with the amount of suspect data coming from at least 2 ADRs...the voting about which is wrong and should be taken out first, then the determination on whether the comparisons between the data from the remaining ADRs was worth performing happens somewhere else, here, inside the PRIMs.
All this is very confusing.
Better stay with my very simple FCOM and accept how they wrote it.
Do I make sense ?