And short of a complete rethink in the control (Ha Ha ) philosophy what are they going to do now that they shouldn't already have done in response to the previous very clear warnings offered by the previous upsets.
Give the human final authority and give it instantly and easily(simple switch).
I liked this one - "It strikes me that Lindbergh had more useful and accurate data available than these poor guys had at their disposal".
Maybe not far away from truth.
"Protections" should be part of the pilot's skills, it's up to him (her)to decide if a particular control input will exceed a/c limits, but maybe this particular control input can save the situation.
To have the "I've got it" switch is very important. This (switch) will put the "student computer"back in his place.
Students think they know how to fly. Computers "think" they know how to fly.
Management thinks computers know how to fly, so why "spend" more money in training pilots?
Important point to think about, IMHO, is that computers haven't mastered the "art" of flying yet, and pilots are gradually loosing their skills due to this "money saving" policy (lack of training).
Pilots have less control of their a/c, but their responsibilities are getting bigger every day...
I would like to comment on these posts. In doing so please understand that I am not "pointing" (as per the offensive finger-wagging emoticon) but rather I am addressing a common perception about this airplane and it's autoflight system in a way that is intended to be respectful and collegial and educational rather than merely disagreeing.
I suspect (and in a few cases, know) that there are some highly experienced people making these points who have made exceptional contributions to this and many other discussions.That is why I think it is important to attempt once again to make something as clear as possible, recognizing that the human, pyschological phenomena called "prejudice" is very much alive and well in this discussion. There are many here making pre-judgements about the airplane without ever having flown it or even understanding it.
In discussing these I believe that the understandings and explanations are crucial to an understanding of this accident and the only reason I bring these notions up at all is I think we all wish to target our energies.
I think further, that anyone who thinks that "the computers" caused this accident through removing control of the aircraft from the pilot without offering the pilot any alternative except the "Spam in a can" position, (a phrase
correctly used by John Glenn to NASA when they were designing the Mercury space capsule) has not flown the Airbus or doesn't understand it or have knowledge of the relevant systems.
Pilots of an Airbus A320/A330/A340 are not relegated to observer status when things go seriously wrong and "the computers won't do what the pilot wants".
What is happening here is "
groupthink" - through past prejudices (absence of knowledge but a strong opinion regardless), or through reading comments about "computers" and parroting it back in their own words, everyone has jumped on this bandwagon. It reminds me exactly, of the nature of the discourse on the Habsheim accident where people STILL think that "the computers did it".
Like so many occurrences that happen when in a crowd, this prejudice has become an irrational rallying cry and has achieved a life of it's own without anyone doing any thinking or questioning.
This does not mean that this design, just like any other design, does not have it's compromises and problems. Every aircraft design has and it is trite to say or argue otherwise that "one design is superior to another". The record speaks for itself, and no one...absolutely no one, is casting an eye towards the most advance airliner in existence, the Dreamliner, and saying the same things and it is far, far more automated than any Airbus. Prejudice does this.
If you have read this far and haven't thrown up your arms and dismissed this as just another Airbus apologist's diatribe, you will know and hopefully appreciate that I am making a plea for understanding, not a plea to "accept" the Airbus as a design. If one is to criticize with any credibility at all, one must criticize from knowledge, not blind prejudice, (unless one simply wishes to do so, in which case, there is no dialogue, or learning, possible).
The argument;
All posters quoted are arguing that "the computers" somehow removed control from the pilot. This is not the case and up until 02:14:59Z, that was not indicated in the ACARS messages we have. The ACARS messages indicate that the crew had full control over the aircraft up to the point where the messages stopped.
The crew almost certainly did not have speed or possibly altitude information due to the loss of pitot (and possibly static) probe data which in turn, caused the loss, possibly of all three, of the ADRs computers. This is indicated in the ACARS messages - "
NAV ADR DISAGREE" is a relatively serious fault.
The ADIRS are not flight control computers. They are a combined Air Data Computer and Inertial Reference Unit into one computer/control panel. I supplied a schematic of the pitot-static system some time ago to help others understand the inputs to the ADR computer.
The ADIRS have nothing to do with the flight controls. The airplane can be flown under complete pilot control (and was) with all the ADIRUs lost. It would be extremely challenging with a high probability of loss of control if the aircraft entered a large CB.
Loss of the ADR computers is a serious abnormality but it will not automatically result in loss of the aircraft. The QRH Unreliable Airspeed procedures, which are memory items and not a "pull out the checklist" item, provide pitch and power data to keep the aircraft within a nominal speed until recovery or other crew action takes place.
Loss of the IRS's is a far more serious emergency if one is in cloud or is flying at night with no visible horizon. But this is not a flight control computer problem - this is a problem which could occur in any airliner design and not just this one.
In at least four cases now, the processes which were created after the Birgenair and Aeroperu B757 accidents occurred, worked, and saved the aircraft.
Failure of the pitot/static system is not a flight control problem.
With the A330 and A340 design, there are three Primary Flight Control Computers and two Secondary Flight Control computers. The aircraft can be flown, under full control, with the loss of all but one of these flight control computers.
The loss of flight data from the pitot-static system will not render any of these five computers unserviceable. Nor do any computers "make up their mind" or "control the aircraft" beyond the pilot's wishes. That simply does not happen and it is time to set the record straight so that it will be possible to comprehend really happened to this aircraft.
I would offer the view that anyone who has prejudged this aircraft likely will be unable to come to further understanding as to what really happened in this accident and it will be the work of others to determine what really occurred. That is what prejudice does - blind one to 'undesired' knowledge, here, and in other human endeavours as well.
Summary;
- failure of the pitot-static system and, consequently, failure of the ADIRS does not affect the ability of the pilot to fly the aircraft using the sidestick.
- failure of the ADIRS does not by itself lead to loss of pilot controllability of the 330/340.
- Failure of the IRSs can result in loss of the aircraft through absence of attitude information but as any pilot knows, this can occur in any aircraft, (and does, in general aviation all the time when pilots not qualified on instruments fly into cloud).
- The A330/A340 aircraft's five flight control computers would not be disabled by the loss of pitot-static data. Any one of these computers alone, will provide full controllability of the aircraft "directly", (in Direct Law, in short, an ordinary airplane), just like the B777 will when its flight control computers degrade, for whatever reason, the Direct "law", (Boeing doesn't call it a "law"). The "big switch" in the 777 permits the pilot to manually switch to Direct control but control is still electronic and not "cable-and-pulley". I can supply the schematic, if anyone wishes to compare systems).
- The question of loss of all five flight control computers via the loss of all ADIRS input is not answered in the information I have available. However, loss of all five flight control computers, (by whatever reason), results in a heavily degraded controllability through rudder, THS, (Trim Horizontal Stabilizer) and engine thrust; more control than the Sioux City DC10 but not sufficient controllability to withstand entry into a thunderstorm.
My sole intention here is to educate, not to criticize points of view. I know there is a delicate balance in a discussion with other professionals.
I think there are good reasons to base criticism of the 320/330/340 design philosophy upon, but citing notions that "the pilot has no control over the airplane", or that " 'the computers' have taken control" is not a solid, nor informed basis for such criticism.
BOAC;
Full computer control UNTIL sufficient degredation of inputs etc occurs, then straight to Direct Law - not forgetting along the way to teach pilots to fly.
Yes. But that is what the aircraft does anyway which is exactly what the B777 does - same process, slightly different arrangement. In "Direct", both systems are ultimately controlled by computers and wire, not by cables-and-pulleys, but ultimately always under the full control of the pilot in both designs, Airbus and Boeing.
Your remark concerning training is absolutely spot-on. Forces beyond our immediate control but seripticiously with our compliance, have tried to "remove us from the cockpit", so to speak, downplaying experience, training and all else a pilot does, legitimized by the impression that "pilots are expensive". As I said to
Will Fraser in agreeing with his views on the hubris of automation, the philosophy engendered by the advent of the first fbw design does have a basis for criticism and I and many of my colleages said so and did so at the time we were being checked out. I recall when the 320 had no such thing as VNAV and we flew it with either "Open Descent", (FlCh for Boeings) or Vertical Speed and nothing else. When the "Full Standard" was introduced, we were handed a 300-page "FMGS Pilots Guide" and told to learn it on the job. No training, no guidance. This was in the days just after the Madras and Strasbourg accidents where mode confusion was still a new thing and no one knew. That was the approach taken and I have to observe that it hasn't changed much in twenty years. I think it is about to.
lomapaseo;
One thing that sticks with me so far is that the pilot comments on this thread seem to have a pretty good idea of what they would have done in the the loss of air-data turbulence scenario.
If my interpretation is correct then this is a pointer for searching for other factors.
Yes. That is one of the reasons I wished to take some time to write this rather longish post. I think looking towards "the computers" for a cause is a rabbit trail; we will not be able to determine what happened by following it.
I sense, (and that's all it is) that this is an extremely complex accident and hope that this is both understood and appreciated by the BEA and all other flight safety organizations.
PJ2