SUPERTANS
Over a long time I have tried to explain how the Doppler/GPS nav computer can be inaccurate after a sea crossing and have given at least one example pertinent to this case and have referred to Flt Lt Tapper's expressed concern over the accuracy of it – such that, one would have thought, no sensible pilot would have relied upon it alone to have approached that fuzzy headland, while still at speed, any where near as close as the position where they changed the waypoint – I have posted annotated charts so that readers can see just how close this was. To have changed this waypoint to “B” at that point because they had decided to then turn to B to continue route flying makes no sense as B was of no use to keep them clear of the immediate high ground, the route to B being towards even higher ground than that which they hit – to have been safe just turning towards B would have entailed a turn several miles earlier because of their approach track to the coast (nearly along it as you can see from the annotated charts).
Tecumse: Flt Tapper was the captain of this a/c and, as he was an acknowledged expert of such nav systems, would not have needed the “paperwork” to tell him that this system could not be relied upon for sufficient accuracy to have approached so closely.
I can perhaps understand why so many cannot follow this argument after the recent apparently appalling lack of familiarity with detailed practical navigation demonstated in posts here, skills which I believe would be essential to SF helo pilots and crewmen and so I conclude that the most valuable potential contributors to this thread, such crews, are holding back from contributing to this debate.
PLANNING
As I have said before, the planning for this sortie is still a foggy area that should have been clarified in every detail given that there are so many anomalies that do not fit with a basic ferry flight that just needed to pass by the Mull.
Cazatou has quite rightly pointed out several irregularities in the planning; even his breakfast issue has relevence as, when combined with his alleged wandering off to a met brief at the remote (from the ops area) met office (not usual, I am told), the captain was away from the rest of the crew for a sufficient time to have attended a meeting.
One such anomaly that must have been decided upon in the planning with others who remained on the ground (and presumably are still around somewhere) is the choice of call sign – they used their full callsign F4J40 in calls to ATC, ARCHITECT, and Scotmil. Off this thread, I have been told by more than one source that this would have been appropriate as an exercise call sign. Apart from a red herring from someone (Beagle?) about tri-graphs (?) no one here has addressed this satisfactorily.
The potential relevence, as I see it, of their use of an exercise call sign is that it would have been appropriate if they were demonstrating equipment to home in on, say, a downed pilot or to get to a point in marginal conditions to simulate an extraction of SF personnel. The candidate equipment I have described (CPLS working with a PRC112 on the ground at, supposedly, the LZ) would fit with such an exercise and, if it was not at the LZ but ½ mile or so further up the slope, would explain all that is known about this crash – that equipment is intrinsically very accurate for distance measurement and readings of range by it would have been.taken in preference to anything that the SuperTANS was giving (perhaps that's why they dumped waypoint A having decided that the SuperTANS was of no further use in this area for the purposes of the close approach to the LZ) – with difficult conditions on the ground ahead for visual judgment of range, they could have got too close too fast before they realised the deception.
Was the classified equipment (blanked out in the BOI text available) CPLS? - a pertninent question the Mull group, as interested parties, could surely ask - even if they cannot divulge the answer to the public, they would at least know themselves and be able to amend their strategy for clearing the pilots' names.
Those of you who are reluctant to expose any such exercise lest you cause embarrassment to your service should bear in mind that the service has left these two pilots hanging out to dry and you may potentially be obstructing any chance of investigating whether a third party maliciously caused the crash by being knowingly out of position – a scenario the implications of which are so serious that, however unlikely or distasteful, it needs to be thoroughly explored.
Brian Dixon
Your response (#4930) to the first paragraph of John Purdey's post #4929 did not concede that the group's strategy has often blocked debate for months at a time over the years – precious time lost as memories fade – while awaiting the outcome of the group's various submissions with the advice to all of “not muddying the waters”, etc. which seemed (to me at least) that the strategy was to not dig any deeper lest anything crop up which reinforced the verdict of pilot error. I made the point years ago that this did not seem like a vote of confidence in the pilots – from their profile, I have never thought them capable of a simple CFIT, I rather thought that they must have been misled somehow and that no amount of further digging would woresen the case for their exoneration, that there was nothing to lose in regard to clearing their names by exploring all possible alternatives that fit the available data.
I completely agree that there was never evidence beyond any doubt whatsover that gross negligence had occurred but you have to understand why this verdict cannot be overturned just yet – the requirement of proof for such a verdict would resound with most politicians (as so many have legal backgrounds) that it was definitely a simple case of pilot error and so any suggestion of foul play is to be discouraged, that the public should be reassured that it was a simple accident. This has been important for the peace process as there may have been, and still could be, public unrest and rejection of that peace process if such principal opponents of concessions to the terrorists as those top members of the NI security team on board had been removed as a political expedient – anything less than “beyond all reasonable doubt” would not allay suspicions in the public of foul play, and so until the peace process has run its course politicians would not risk disturbing the findings that have served them so well thus far.
So the Mull group is not going to get anywhere just arguing the case as it has done – there needs to be a breakthrough. To get a change of the verdict there has to be a proveable alternative scenario other than their blundering into an isolated low hill being caused by hypothetical improbable control issues for which there is no evidence in the event. If you can get a sufficiently credible body of opinion (from aircrew experienced in SH ops at the time) that it looked like they were participating in an exercise that has been hithereto undisclosed by the authorities then there is doubt in the official verdict and the pilots' names must surely be cleared. If this was the case, it may well turn out that, after detailed investigation, it was a genuine accident brought about by personnel on the ground getting it wrong – so no public disquiet – but the investigation needs to get to that level of detail to positively determine fault. It was just too damn easy to blame the pilots.
I have tried to have a face to face meeting with members of the Mull group on previous trips to the UK but without success – I believe that a meeting where all available information can be presented and discussed would surely be constructive – especially if people with the right experience would attend, even with anonymity (as has been preserved in the transcripts of the inquiries) – it could even result in “conspiracy theories” being rationally dismissed (which to date they have not) saving people like me a lot of time and effort.
So, Brian, how about such a meeting in the next few months at a location and time convenient to your good selves. I'll make the effort to get over there (again) – I miss the beer anyway.