I'd like to direct a comment toward the VS/Rudder separation. From AA587, we know the failure was complete, and purportedly caused by pilot input beyond structural limit. Here, we know the failure was complete, though the cause and sequence is unknown.
A short aside re: MD11 gear. In Narita, one noticed how astonishingly robust the NG and one of the MG were, the nose gear remaining attached even after that last horrific nose plant, the Main pushing up and through the main spar of the wing. BA038 lost the gear and saved the hull.
Here's the thing. The composite VS is exceedingly strong, as well as relatively light, and demonstrably resistant to failure except at the root, where it attaches to the fuselage. It remains pristine, not a crack in its skin.
Its failure at the root is obviously related (Lateral failure, if such was the case, as I believe) to its leverage on the root, a tall structure that is acting through its moment arm on a robust attachment.
I am pointing out that its only failure was complete; it resisted until the total failure was unavoidable. If however the structure was designed to have top down sequential failure, a component at a time, each loss of surface area would reduce its advantage on the root, allowing for the remainder of the fin to operate in reduced effectiveness, but allowing for directional stability. Something as simple as two or three parallel seams such that the first piece to depart might be the topmost one meter, the next failure point halfway, until the moment arm was short enough that the fuselage attachment would be virtually failure proof, though providing very limited D/S.
I can't take my eyes off that nearly perfect fin.
One can envision 587 retaining some fin if not rudder. Rudder is a trimming device, without it things are difficult, lose the VS and you lose the a/c.
WF