yes, the Air Caraïbe safety report is a must read: it describes a similar sequence of fault reports and the loss of any protection (expt. load factor) in alternate law 2, without any possibility to revert to normal law. It also reports that some parts of the "unreliable speed" procedures are difficult to implement in real time, that GPS altitude & ground speed were used, that the icing of the Pitot probes goes hand in hand with an augmentation of the TAT (which then reflects the ice accretion), and several undue alarms.
The following EASA airworthiness directive is about the Quantas A330 which plunged due to a faulty ADR of the ADIRU1 which generated a NAV IR1 fault... and a nose down
http://www.securiteaerienne.com/ill/...9-0012-E_1.pdf the failing ADIRU couldn't be switched off and prevented from contaminating the other (reliable) data. Isn't it strange that one faulty ADIRU (only faulty in its ADR part), even if it did not declared itself faulty, could bring down a plane whereas you had two other functional ADIRUs to cross-check data and detect outliers/unconsistant measures (AoA): I don't understand where is redundancy here ?
Anybody knows whether laser velocimetry (already used by Airbus on planes to study the turbulences in the wake of their airliners) is envisionned in the future to augment the anemometric chain ?
Time is running, hope the many people at sea will succeed into the recovery of the black box.
Jeff
PS) from eurocockpit (based on the A330 troubleshooting manual):
34 11 15 EFCS2 : PROBE-PITOT 1+2 / 2+3 / 1+3
triggered the real time warning (WRN) "F/CTL ALTN LAW"
27 93 34 EFCS1 : FCPC1 or FCPC2 with many subsequent possibilities(the message is truncated after EFCS2X
34 22 00 ISIS : should read here ISIS (22FN- 10FC) ALTITUDE FUNCTION or ISIS (22FN- 10FC) ATTITUDE FUNCTION or (22FN- 10FC) SPEED OR MACH FUNCTION. truncated message again
34 12 34 IR2 : ADIRU1 (1FP1) / ADIRU2 (1FP2) or bien ADIRU2 (1FP2) or ADIRU2 (1FP2) / ADR BUS 1 or ADIRU3 (1FP3) / ADIRU2 (1FP2). message truncated, no way to say which of the 4 subsystems is failing
22 83 34 AFS : this is about the FMGEC1 (1CA1) but message trucated after (1CA1), beyond the failure of FMGEC1 itself, the TSM suggests 38 failure modes.