Diaz: Easy to explain the difference, as you see one of the key questions is: If there is a difference between what you know and what you do we can see potential problems.
"Instinct" is the keyword here.
Why it is dangerous? Such instincts can kick in when something bad happens. These instincts are supposed to protect your life, but if you are flying an aircraft they can be dangerous. These protections aren't important in everyday operation when you don't even come close to the limits. But when your instincts try to save you but place you in danger, they can be important. Sadly it is about the same time when you can lose protections...
Jetdoc: I think you posted about a valid problem, the question is: I would say the feedback should be gradual for exactly this reason. If they would see any specific limit when controlling the aircraft it would be a valid risk, if they would see gradual feedback from the aircraft (they would feel it is harder to push the stick in one way) then these added protections could work as extra information.
Clandestino: As you see, the first post speaks about common oppinions about the FBW concept. I doesn't say I agree with them, but it is there to show, that there are many different approaches used to design FBW software and it is one of the few things people do remember about differences between Airbus and Boeing, it is something where they do have oppinions. And this is why I say while consensus isn't reached about what can and what should an FBW system do, there is still some place to discuss possibilities. Which is the point of the thread.
How early a warning can be, and how long you can maintain protections, feedback, etc largely depends on the cause of the problems. Of course the question is: Some would argue that if the level of protection (and warning) could be different in different scenarios wouldn't that confuse pilots who expect a warning? I hope that in most cases you use your knowledge, skills, etc to fly. The protections are needed when some pilots might use instincts and in such cases they can't observe same limits so easily.
Mind if I also point out one thing more: When the pilots are flying the aircraft, they often don't have time for checking charts, doing calculations, and knowing what will be save. When these data can be important for safety any way to see / feel / etc these data can potentially improve safety.
Why warnings and why no constantly displayed data? Because if I recall correctly, too many irrevelant data displayed at once could force the pilot to split his attention and can be dangerous, this is why the amount of displayed extra data should be limited to warnings and alternatives to lost instrument readings. And these options are only present if you can make sure they are reliable enough.
fc101: In first part of your comment, you speak about "how safety critical systems work", then, you say the requirement is experience in how avionics are determined.
And sadly, most people who "played with windows", wouldn't consider the possible risks, and how it can be implemented or other such topics, and probably wouldn't point to anything new.
Let me remind you most Windows systems doesn't know "how long a measured data is valid" based on physical possibilities, windows isn't designed to decide: If I can't measure airspeed, how can it be calculated.