Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

[dalek]

There but for the Grace of God

I am a retired Navigator with just over ten thousand hours. I have a few hours in the RHS/ Rumbold seat of Chinooks and Pumas and a couple of hundred in other helicopters as a HELIFAC instructor, in Germany in the mid 80's.
I spent the second half of my career primarily on C130's but in my time at Farnborough and Boscombe, Mid 90's, notched up a few other types.
I have Been SFSO at Honington and Lynham and UFSO at Farnborough and Boscombe. A total of over seven years in FSO posts.
During that time I have processed a couple of hundred incident and two accident reports. I have trawled through several hundred more.
I have been fortunate enough never to have to deal with a fatal accident or process any report on an aircraft on which I have no experience.
I first read the Mull BOI report while at Farnborough. To understand the accident, I always try to to put myself in the place of the crew.


Here goes:

We have left Adergrove in a C130. We have descended to 250 ft and are approaching the Mull. I am standing in my normal position behind the Co-pilot.
The conditions are barely acceptable and deteriorating. Even if the Captain, is happy to press on, there will quickly be a comment from either me, the Co or the Flight Engineer. If the Captain persists, the comments will become protests, cullminating in the words "penetrate, penetrate, go".
At that point the Captain will apply power, regardless of his own opinion of the conditions, and start to climb. I will pass best heading and SALT. The Co will put out a radio call. The Eng will select (Engine and Airframe anti- icing ?). At SALT we would revise the plan. Problem solved.
At that point, unlike the Chinook, with engine anti-icing and airframe de-icing, an IFR transit would have been possible. Or we may have considered a cloud break approach at Prestwick.

What happens in a Chinook? I have asked a couple of operators and it is much the same. Besides the Co, at least one of the ALM's would have been monitoring the Navigation, either from the rumbold seat or the door. I am with Airborne Aircrew here, I find it inconceivable that an experienced Co and ALM allowed John Tapper to Negligently approach the Mull without protest.
Perhaps they did protest and in blatant disregard of crew advice, the captain pressed on. In which case he is certainly guilty of Gross Negligence. But what about the Co, he could hardly drag JT out of the seat. If RC did protest and was overruled he is innocent of all blame.
This scenario is easily disproved with a CVR. Oh! bu**er.

The major problem with this scenario is that it requires a Captain that is arrogant, foolish and overconfident. Everyone I have talked to says JT was not. If he didn't climb or slow or turn, he almost certainly received no advice to do so.

None of this rules out Negligence, but it shows that either JT felt no need to carry out any emergency climb, slowdown or turn, or he was unable to do so.

Unable to do so:

Back to the much maligned Sqn Ldr Burke.
He has stated under oath that he himself had suffered control restictions probably caused by loose articles, and was aware of others. He also explained that bad connectors had caused power interupts.
This evidence was never presented tho the BOI. Why?
It was accepted by the HOL.
Cazatou rubbishes the HOL Committee because they were not pilots, but they did not need to be. Control restrictions in cars, trucks and trains can be equally fatal. Or can't they rule on those accidents either?
And any connector that fails due to vibration is "bad", whether it is on a critical component on an aircraft, or holding up my trousers.
If these events had happened in the past, and no rectification had taken place they could happen again. They could and possibly did.
So perhaps, bastOn, they could not "fly the aircraft."

Did this happen. Probably not, law of averages.
But enough doubt to take it to "Beyond Reasonable Doubt."

Lastly. Aircrew Error or some other reason.
You are approaching the coast. You are planning to turn at around 2 miles. You follow the kit to the 2 mile point but in fact because of an error of entry by you, or a transient fault in the TANS you are at less than 1. Visual illusion has drawn you in.
BastOn has pointed out that DR Navigation will resolve this, but he is wrong.
DR circle of uncertainty increases with speed and time. The 70% circle of uncerainty around your DR position, is 3 to 4 miles.

Then again, perhaps it was something completely different.
John Purdy sneers at the "Flies in the Cockpit theory".
I have in my logbook:
March 25 1980 Canberra TT18 639 F/L JM Wembury + LL Area2 2.20 Day
My pilot was stung in the face by a wasp at at 250ft / 300kts.
What followed was one or two of the most frightening moments in my whole career.