PJ2 Loose_rivets;
Of far greater concern here, I think you'd agree, is the power of convective columns within the thunderstorm cell(s) and the possibility of low to poor radar returns from same. Like most who do/did this work, I've seen it once or twice and been surprised at the violence of "what wasn't supposed to be there according to the radar".
That is indeed the greatest concern. I'm not sure why anyone is even talking about a lightning strike being a cause of this horrible accident in the face of growing evidence via ACARS messages and transposed weather analysis that the aircraft was being subjected to a sustained measure of severe to extreme turbulence just prior to being lost.
The aircraft doesn't have a lightning strike detector and the pilot didn't report a strike! The whole "lightning" theory was put forth as an off-the-cuff extrapolation from a "short" message when it hadn't come to light there was also a susequent 4-minute stream of other messages showing the autopilot disconnect, reversion to abnormal law, other electical failures, and cabin press problems.
IF the aircraft encountered severe-to-extreme turbulence at high altitude (that accounted for the autopilot off and abnormal law), heavy with fuel, and quickly ended up in a
jet upset (which would explain the AP/abnormal law) where the only path brought you into more developing weather, the chances for engine flame-out (cabine press problems) would also be high during the whole event and the aerodynamic forces even more extreme
including torsional forces no aircraft is designed to withstand.
I think many are on a "Can't see the forest for the trees" snipe hunt there because their interest or hobby lies with electrics. If anyone steps away from the keyboard, however, and pushes their computer from the desk to the floor and proceeds to kicks it around, you'll get those same kind of messages if it could report it. Those electrical faults did not happen outside the
much larger problem of that entire aircraft being subjected to severe outside conditions.
I believe (yes, speculate) this tragic event was a result of a severe/extreme turbulence enounter at altitude still heavy with fuel, and subsequent jet upset..ACARS electrical report of failures a result of equipment being hammered ....with a subsequent loss of aerodynamic
and engine control.
The "Forest" here is the
aerodynamic/aircraft control issue due to severe-to-extreme turbulence because the aircraft was operating at high altitude. It's just not about the Airbus being able to handle the stress of such turbulence directly if it's flying right-side up
below is Turbulent Air penetration speed with
plenty of margin between stall and overspeed, the hull probably can. But if the aircraft was heavy for FL 350, slowing to a turbulent air penetration speed also brings any aircraft at high altitude closer to the AOA where control can be lost if it's hit with other, sudden outside forces and the flight controls can't respond quickly enough.
The training for recovering from a loss of an aerodynamic loss-of-control event at high altitude in jet, transport aircraft is minimal to none and given the pilots may have to attempt it during continuous, CB-produced turbulence is perhaps impossible. That's why flying into forecast areas of even moderate turbulence at heavy at high altitude where buffet margins are close is to be avoided, and anything severe escaped with haste, the problem being initiating a higher-than-half bank (such as when you're hand-flying which it seem these AF pilots may have had to) turn after you're in it possibly making the difference between staying inside your buffet boundary and going outside it.
Anyway, the electric faults would more likely be a result of something going aerodynamically amiss with this flight related to the weather, not a cause for it going amiss. I don't buy the "lightning strike made bad things happen" scenario a bit. Lightning is a small worry yes, but it's the LAST thing that's worrisome about operating in close/too-close proximity to severe thunderstorms. Some have latched onto it because it happened to be included in the "possibility" first statement given by a
PR man at AF, and are experiencing a Primacy of Learning tunnel-vision, IMO.
Aerodynamics, not Electrics, would seem to be the right tree to be barking up. Given moder aircraft design, explaining the loss of an aircraft due to electrical fault-as-beginning-the-failure-cascade scenarios is exceedingly difficult at best.
Explaining electrical faults (as well as other system faults and the pilots inability to communicate) due to severe buffeting and aerodynamic loss of control and engines seems far more likely, and not a "first time in history, one in a million chance" occurance. These things have happened too many times, and it's why aviators learned long before anyone here began their careers avoiding those weather conditions takes priority over all else, and loss of control at high altitude is a can of stress and engine control worms nobody want to ever open.
This aircraft was 3 hrs into a flight fueled for an 11hr trip, and at FL350, over 200 pax. Can any of you experienced Airbus 330-200 guys tell us what the likely weight and the low-end buffet boundaries for for that weight would be? And what max turb air penetration speed is? What was the ISA deviation at FL350 in that area that night?