Lightning Strikes causing composite material destruction.
Putting aside a catastrophic failure due to an explosion or structural failure due to turbulence experienced.
I find it very unlikely this A330 was operated (AF and it's very excellent training, maint. history and no doubt Crews) in any sort of unprofessional way! Aside from the A340 runway over-run and crash in Toronto on Aug. 2nd 2005, (which could have been avoided), AF has an excellent operational record.
So let us talk about electrical discharges.
Remember back in Jan. 19, 1995 when that Bristow heli was struck by lightning and ditched (successfully) in the North Sea?
The UK CAA realized later the electrical bolt was so powerful (>300,000 AMPS) it literally caused the partially composite tail rotor to explode (It was recovered from the Seabed and I believe the leading edge of the tail rotor was titanium metal which was the root cause of lightning attraction, transfer and melting). Tail rotors were redesigned after this.
I have read many articles that on the 787 there is a huge unknown risk of composite degradation and unpredictable reactions to very high temperature and Ampere lightning strikes.
So whether a possible HOT or COLD lightning strike were experienced by this aircraft with temps of 15-60,000 Deg. F and the related incredibly high AMPS, we may eventually see after recovery and analysis of debris another example of the unknowns of natural atmospheric conditions and the destructive effects it has on fly-by-wire and/or electronics and composite construction used in aircraft.
I believe the Los Alamos Laboratory FORTE satellite is still in low Earth Equatorial orbit , which makes several passes over that area and may if in the right spot had made measurements of tha area.
Of course we should assume that this aircraft may have been within or most likely many many miles away (the Crew would have used the radar returns and visual orientation to "pick their Track") from any electrically discharging Cell at the time and was just in the wrong place at the wrong time (assuming that a lightning strike was the or a contributing cause for this disaster).
I am confident the Crew was using all resources to maintain control of the a/c until the very bitter end.
Maybe even the ECAM or Non-normal Checklist were of no help in this final unwritten, untrained for or simulated situation? Think back to Lauda 004 on May 26, 1991 and their Nr.1 reverse thrust indication/deployment.
Maybe unlike CP Sully and his Crew, this was a no-win situation, then we Pilots will hopefully be given valuable information from the Investigation that will ensure for us, our Crews, Pax and cargo - safer operational levels.
Always very sad to hear of such events and condolences to all involved!