My background is on the maintenance end of things so take my opinion for what its worth. I am normally happy to be a reader but I feel compelled to duck out of cover just this once so please be gentle.. I think this investigation has, or at least should have a huge impact on the industry I am passionate about.
I will not bore you with my theories other than to say I think the article Huck copied in post 1341 is spot on. I just wanted to pass on what I read today and how I think it clears up the tail plane stall issue. (in my mind at least)
After reading the transcripts of the CVR my impression was that it is being kind to think that tailplane stall was what the captain was thinking.
I followed up today by reading the NTSB interviews in their docket section on this investigation, (
CD List Of Contents ) particularly the "Buffalo interviews" section with line captains and F/Os, that view is reinforced. When asked what tailplane stall training they had, they state the NASA video was the only training received with the instructors saying afterward that the tailplane stall portion of the video was not applicable to the Q400.
The responses from students and check airmen both stressed not losing more than 100 ft in response to the stick shaker. Power on and "Riding the shaker" to minimize the altitude loss until you get your airspeed back up. Refer back to the article Huck posted on how this training affects reactions to the shaker.
I am afraid dwelling on icing, tail plane or otherwise is muddying the waters as to the cause of this accident and the training issues that need to be addressed. That's my take on it anyway.
William (ducks back under cover)